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I.

INTRODUCTION

Both the legal and the medical professions hold out disclosure
and consent as the linchpins of ethical practice.' Although not all
professional relationships may live up to the ethical ideals of the profession, the patient or client may in many cases give informed consent (after appropriate disclosure) to the imperfect relationship and
cure what would otherwise be unethical practice. Informed consent
is usually a practical and workable solution, as the ethical ideal is often not achievable in practice within the boundaries of the existing
I See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Informed Consent: Defining Limits Through Therapeutic
Parameters,16 WHITTIER L. REv. 187, 187 (1995) ("One of the hallmarks of the physician-patient relationship is disclosure.").
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995) (hereinafter Model
Rules], Rule 1.5(c) (division of fees among lawyers prohibited unless, inter alia, client consents), Rule 1.6(a) (client confidences may be waived by consent), Rule
1.8(a) (lawyer may not acquire an interest adverse to client unless, inter alia, client
consents), Rule 1.8 (g) (lawyer may not make aggregate settlement of multiple clients' claims without consent); AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS:
CuRrr OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, xlii (1996-97)
[hereinafter AMA Code of Ethics] (physician should not reveal patient confidences
without consent) (Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship
item No. 4), Opinion 2.07 (consent required for patient participation in clinical
investigation of new drugs or procedures), Opinion 2.08 (consent required before
physician may make commercial use of patient's organs or tissues), Opinion 2.132
(no genetic testing for employment purposes without, inter alia, consent).
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system for delivery of professional services; disclosure and consent
are usually neither inappropriate nor damaging to the professionalclient relationship. Unfortunately, disclosure is not always a panacea.
In recent years, new stresses on the physician-patient relationship have been created by the advent of managed care systems. Managed care attempts to realign the health care delivery system so that
those who are responsible for health care costs (physicians and other
providers) have incentives to take account of those costs in making
treatment decisions. However, in removing the traditional incentives
for limitless health care spending without regard to cost,3 managed
care threatens to substitute a new, equally perverse incentive: the
incentive to provide too little care. Health insurers operating managed care plans have attempted to effect changes in physicians' behavior patterns by the use of cost-containment incentives.
This article addresses the potential conflict of interest between
the physician's financial interest in limiting care and the patient's interest in obtaining all treatment of marginal benefit, whatever the
cost. Although the physician-patient relationship is fundamentally a
contractual relationship, freedom of contract is limited by society's
interest in the physician-patient relationship and the importance to
the public of maintaining the integrity of that relationship.
Although medical ethicists and a presidential commission 4 have
called for disclosure of financial incentives imposed by managed care
companies as a prerequisite to ethical practice in managed care, no
defined limit to the doctrine of disclosure has yet been articulated.
In the search for clarification of the appropriate scope of the patient's power to assent to an altered physician-patient contract, this
Article looks to the ethical rules governing lawyers and the lawyerclient relationship. If a third party pays for legal services rendered to
another, the lawyer is only allowed to accept the representation on
these terms if the client consents after full disclosure and if the lawyer reasonably believes that the third-party payor will not affect the
lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of the client. If a disinterested lawyer would not believe that this latter requirement is satisfied, the lawyer is ethically prohibited from accepting the representation on the terms offered, even if the client, after full disclosure of
the conflict of interest, is willing to accept representation on those
terms.
See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
See Robert Pear, Panel of Experts Urges Broadening of Patient Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1997, at Al.
3
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This Article proposes that such a rule be applied to physicians
entering into contractual relationships with managed care organizations. Such a rule would benefit physicians and patients. It would
recognize, first, that the principle of freedom of contract does not
apply well to patient-physician relationships, because of the imbalance of expertise, necessity of trust in the physician, and the nature
of managed care contracts as adhesion contracts. Second, it would
restore the physician to the position of protector of the patient's best
interest. The physician would have an affirmative ethical obligation
not to enter into managed care relationships in which a disinterested
physician would not agree that the inherent conflicts of interest can
be resolved in harmony with the best interests of the patient. Third,
it would preserve the patient's interest in autonomy, since the rule
requires that both the physician and the patient approve of the relationship. Fourth, it would recognize that the mere existence of a potential conflict of interest is not necessarily fatal to a productive and
therapeutic professional relationship. Fee-for-service medicine created conflicts of interest; the conflicts created by cost-containment
principles of managed care are different in kind, but not necessarily
in degree, and there is no way to remove all conflicts of interest from
the practice of medicine. 5 Fifth, the proposed rule has the advantage of flexibility, as it applies to all third-party payor conflicts of interest, both those that exist today and those the market will generate
tomorrow. The proposed rule would rely on the professional judgment, good faith and ethical guidelines of physicians, backed up by
the regulatory power of state disciplinary agencies to enforce those
guidelines, and would not unduly restrict the ability of physicians to
participate in market innovations. Sixth, the proposed rule would
provide a standard for review of questionable practices by insurers,
managed care organizations, and physicians. This standard has
worked well for lawyers, and there is no reason to believe that it
would be unworkable in the medical context.
Part II of this Article provides a brief description of the managed care marketplace as it exists today. Part III outlines the conflicts of interest facing physicians practicing medicine under a managed care system, and the existing guidelines and regulations

5 See Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273

JAMA 338, 338 (Jan. 25, 1995) ("[W]e must recognize that no system of reimbursement is devoid of financial self-interest."); David Orentlicher, Health Care ReHEALTH MATRIX 141, 170 (1995); E.
HAAvI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHics OF MEDICINE'S NEw
ECONOMICS 38 (1995).

form and the Physician-PatientRelationship, 5
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regarding these conflicts, which, unfortunately, provide limited
guidance to the practicing physician when negotiating with managed
care organizations. In searching for this guidance, Part IV compares
the physician's role in managed care to the attorney's role in settings
in which third parties pay for the cost of legal representation, describing the regulatory system that the organized bar has developed
to police attorneys' conflicts of interest. Part V sets forth a proposal
that organized medicine should institute a similar standard to police
the conflicts of interest of physicians under managed care.
II. THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE
A.

BriefHistoy of the Rise of Managed Care

The health insurance industry in the United States is undergoing a period of intensive change in its structure and delivery mechanisms. Prior to 1980, ninety to ninety-five percent of Americans with
health insurance were covered under traditional indemnity plans,
and only five to ten percent were covered under Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) or other alternative delivery mechanisms.6
Under indemnity plans, physicians were reimbursed for medical care
rendered on a retrospective basis and with very little oversight or
questioning of the charges made. Unfortunately, this lack of oversight and cost-containment mechanisms, combined with the explosion of medical technology after World War II, produced dramatic
increases in health care costs. 8 In response to these cost increases,
payors, employers and the government began exploring alternatives
to the traditional system for delivery of and payment for medical
services.9 In 1973, Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act (HMO Act),"0 which encouraged the development and
registration of HMOs." Although HMOs had been in existence at
least since 1927 in the western United States,'2 the HMO Act encourSeeJon Gabel et al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, 7 HEALTH

6

AFr.

48, 53 (Summer 1988).

7 See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization
Review and Financial Risk

Shifting: CompensatingPatientsfor Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1993).
8 See MORREIm, supra note 5, at
9-10.

See Randall, supra note 7, at 16-17.
42 U.S.C. §§300e-300e-17 (1997) [hereinafter the "HMO Act"].
1 See Randall, supra note 7, at 25.
12 See Sarah Glazer, The Failureto ContainMedical Costs, 2 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 510,
511 (1988) (crediting Doctor Michael A. Shadid of Oklahoma with establishing the
first prepaid group practice in 1927); see also Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., Liability of
9

10
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aged their proliferation and expansion to most other areas of the
country. From 1973 to 1987, the number of HMOs in existence grew
from seventy-two to more than seven hundred,"' and the number of
Americans covered under HMOs instead of traditional fee-for-service
insurance plans increased from 3.5 million to twenty-nine million."
This trend has continued in the last decade, and according to recent
estimates, HMOs and other managed care organizations (collectively
MCOs) provide health insurance services to 165 million Americans.'MCOs were deemed necessary and desirable to the American
health care system as a response to spiraling inflation in the health
care sector. From 1960 to 1993, health care costs as a percentage of
the Gross National Product (GNP) increased from 5.3%16 to fourteen.' 7 At the height of health care inflation, some predicted that
health care costs would exceed thirty-three percent of GNP by the
year 2030.18 In fact, MCOs have achieved some measure of success in
containing the rapid rise in health care costs,' 9 although the longterm cost savings potential remains a subject of debate."
B.

Characteristicsof Managed Care Organizations

The term "managed care" has been defined in many ways by
various commentators on the health care system. 2' A managed care
the HMO for the Medical Negligence of its Providers, 1996 ANDREWS HEALTH L. LIG. REP.
22 (November 1996).
i See Henry Saveth, Health Maintenance Amendments Act of 1988, 291 PLI/TAx
445, 447 (1989).
'4
See id.
15
See Transcriptof State of the Union Message, N.Y. TIMzs,Jan. 28, 1998, atAl9.
16 See Katherine R. Levit et al., National Health Care Spending Trends: 1988, 1990
HEALTH AFF. 171 (Summer 1990).
17 See Kenneth R. Pedroza, Note, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARiZ. L. REv. 399, 400 (1996).
is See Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on Cost Containment, 269
JAMA 631, 636 (1993).
19
See David M. Cutler & Louise Sheiner, Managed Care and the Growth of Medical
Expenditures, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER 6140 (August 1997).
20 See, e.g., MORREIM, supra note 5, at 15-16; Robert Morgan et al., The MedicareHMO Revolving Door - The Healthy Go In and the Sick Go Out, 337 NEW. ENG. J. OF
MED. 169 (Jul. 17, 1997) (demonstrating that sicker Medicare beneficiaries opt out
of HMOs and re-enroll in traditional plans, and that their costs are higher than
those who stayed in traditional plans); David G. Josephson et al., The Medicare-HMO
Revolving Door, 337 NEw. ENG.J. MED. 1851 (Dec. 18, 1997) (criticizing the Morgan
study); Ian Fisher, H.M. 0. Premiums Rising Sharply, Stoking Debate on Managed Care,
N.Y. TIMFs, Jan. 11, 1998, atAl.
21 See, e.g., Thomas William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health
Care: A Plaintiff's Perspective, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 123, 126 (1996) ("The term
'managed care' is given so many interpretations that no firm consensus has arisen
as to a definition."); David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed
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plan may employ physicians directly,22 or simply contract with individual physicians or groups to provide services. It may be operated as
a for-profit entity or as a non-profit organization. Although both the
structure of managed health plans and their contractual arrangements with their providers are subject to near-infinite variation,"
there are common features to most managed care plans. The primary feature of a managed care plan is, obviously, that it imposes
some form of "management" on the health care services delivered
under its direction, and for which it will pay, in an attempt to limit
the amount of unnecessary care and care of only minimal marginal
value provided to its enrollees. 4 This "management" often takes the
form of financial incentives to physicians and other providers to act
in ways that reduce health care expenditures. 2 After a brief review of
typical financial incentives offered by managed care plans, this Article will focus on the conflicts of interest generated by these incentives and the response of the medical profession and regulators to
these conflicts.
1. Payment Mechanisms
Three common payment mechanisms have emerged in managed care: fee-for-service, salary, and capitation. 26 Each presents distinct incentives and thus distinct potential conflicts of interest.

Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693, 1694

(June 5, 1996) ("organizational arrangements that seek to alter treatment practices
so that care of acceptable quality can be provided at lower cost"); Barbara Ross-Lee
et al., Skewed Incentives in our HealthcareDelivery System, 94J. AM. OsrOPATHc Assoc. 849,
855 (October 1994) ("[Aln organized effort to provide a higher quality of healthcare in a
more cost-efficient manner to a greater number of people than the traditional fee-forservice system.").
See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REv. 445, 446 & n.8

(1987). The percentage of physicians employed by managed care organizations
(MCOs), hospitals, or large group practices is increasing. See id.
23 See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 21, at 1694 ("With different combinations of managed care arrangements, there are many different permutations and an
equally wide range of effects.").
See Malone & Thaler, supra note 21, at 126 ("Common to all forms of managed care is an attempt to control costs by modifying the manner in which patients
utilize the health care system.").
,' See DianaJoseph Bearden & BryanJ. Maegden, Emerging Theories of Liability in
the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285, 294-295 (1995).
56 See generally Alan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers' Views on FinancialIncentives
and Quality, 1991 HEALTH AFF. 208 (Winter 1991); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 158-

60 (1995). [hereinafter Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives].
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Discounted Fee-for-Service

In a fee-for-service managed care system, physicians are reimbursed for services provided at a rate negotiated between the physician and the managed care organization, often expressed as a percentage of discount from the provider's standard fee2 and referred
to as "discounted fee-for-service." Fee-for-service payment is the historical foundation of American medicine, and in modern managed
health care plans is most often found in preferred
provider organiza28
HMO.
of
form
any
than
tions (PPOs) rather
Fee-for-service medicine has been roundly criticized for its role
in contributing to the dramatic increase in medical costs, since the
physician's income is direcdy related to the amount of services provided by the physician.2 When combined with widespread health insurance that insulates the patient from the cost of the services provided to him, this creates incentives for physicians: (1) to continue
to provide service to the patient beyond the point when the marginal
benefit to the patient of the service provided is less than the cost of
the service to the patient (or the patient's insurer), and (2) to continue providing services until the marginal service provided yields no
benefit whatsoever, or actually causes minimal detriment to the patient."0 These incentives may be compounded by demands for more
services from the patient who, because he does not bear the direct
cost of the services provided, has no incentive to seek cost-effective
care.5 ' The health care industry has responded to the incentives for
overutilization present in the fee-for-service system by introducing
measures designed to counter these incentives 2 and by introducing
alternative payment mechanisms.
See Malone & Thaler, supra note 21, at 126. The discount is bargained for and
granted in exchange for the volume of business that the MCO brings to the physician. See, e.g., MARc A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS'
CONFLtCTS OF INTREsr 33 (1993) [hereinafter RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS].
2s

See Marsha R. Gold et. al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed Care

Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1678 (December 21, 1995).
This study found that, for primary care physicians, 90% of preferred provider organizations (PPOs) surveyed paid physicians through a fee-for-service system with
no withhold or bonus structure, as compared with 3% of group or staff model
HMOs and 12% of network or independent-practice-association model HMOs. See
id. For specialty physicians, the percentages paid through fee-for-service were 97%,
24%, and 42%, respectively. See id.
29 See, e.g., Ross-Lee et al., supra
note 21, at 850-55.
30 See id. at 851-52.
31 See id. at 850-51.
32 See RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS, supra note 27,
at 55; Orenticher, Financial
Incentives, supra note 26, at 161.
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Salary

A managed care organization may pay its physicians a flat salary,
regardless of the volume of patient visits, referrals generated by the
physician, or other utilization measures. Although a physician paid a
salary has no direct incentive to deny care or to provide unnecessary
care, two indirect incentives do affect the care provided by the salaried physician. First, the salaried physician has an incentive to stay
employed. To the extent that continued employment decisions are
made by the MCO on the basis of utilization measures, those utilization measures will be a factor in the physician's treatment determinations." Second, even absent the first incentive, the physician has
an incentive to expend as few hours as possible in earning her salary,
in order to maximize the aggregate utility she realizes from her time.
If the physician will earn the same salary whether she works 35 or 85
hours per week, the "extra" 50 hours can be more profitably spent in
other pursuits. Thus, even though there is no incentive to provide
less care to any particular patient, there is an incentive to provide
less access to care to the patient population."
c.

Capitation

Finally, the plan may use capitation to tie the financial incentives of the physicians directly to the desired utilization rates. Capitation is an increasingly common feature of managed care plans. '
Under a capitated contract, providers are paid a fixed amount of
money for each enrollee of the plan. This amount is often expressed
in terms of a fixed amount of money "per member, per month."
The provider is contractually obligated to provide certain contractually defined services to the entire patient population for which it receives capitation payments. If the provider can provide those services for less cost than the sum total of the capitation payments, it
retains the excess as compensation for services rendered. If the provider cannot provide the designated services with the capitation
payments, it will be liable for the excess, with perhaps a "stop-loss"
provision in the contract to protect the provider in the case of catass See RODWIN, MONEYAND MORALS, supra note 27, at 137. Also, the
salaried, employed physician will realize that her continued employment depends on her em-

ployer's financial health, and will thus be incentivized to reduce costs to contribute
to the employer's bottom line. See id.
U See Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives, supranote 26, at 191-92.
s5 SeeJames C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth of Medical Groups
Paid Through Capitation in California,333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1684, 1686 & n.5 (Dec.

12, 1995).
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strophic losses in the enrolled pool. This incentive structure leads to
dramatically reduced utilization, particularly as measured by days of
hospital stay per capita.6
2.

Withholds and/or Bonuses

A managed care organization may withhold a certain percentage
of the payments it makes to its physicians until the completion of a
measuring period. At the end of the measuring period the withheld
payment will be disbursed or retained, depending on the physicians'
compliance, either individually or collectively, with utilization goals
set by the organization. This withholding is used as an incentive in
plans using all types of payment structures, 8 but is particularly prevalent in plans paying physicians through a fee-for-service model. 9 In
lieu of or in addition to withholding a portion of the physician's
compensation, the plan may provide for a certain amount to be set
aside against specialist utilization. If, at the end of the measuring
period, funds remain in these accounts, the surplus may be divided
with the physicians whose restraint in ordering specialty services created the surplus. Withholds and bonuses create a conflict between
the physician's financial interest and the patient's interest in receiving the maximum amount of covered beneficial care. The physician
who knows that an additional pool of compensation awaits her at the
end of the measuring period in exchange for frugal use of resources
may come to depend on the availability of that compensation, and
thus practice in an overly cost-conscious manner to ensure its payment.
Finally, a physician practicing under managed care contracts has
an implicit incentive to act in the interests of the MCO so as to ensure the continued financial health of the MCO and a steady flow of
patients from the MCO to the physician. The physician in a closedSee id. at tbl. 3 (Between 1990 and 1994, six studied California capitated
medical groups reduced the average number of days of hospitalization per 1000
HMO enrollees not covered by Medicare from 194.4 to 137.3).

37 See Alan L. Hillman, FinancialIncentivesfor
Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG.J. MM. 1743, 1746 (Dec. 31, 1987). MCOs may also

reward physicians for "good behavior" by sharing surpluses through bonuses. See id.
38 See id. at 1745-46. The majority of plans using withholds (45% of all respondent plans) reported that between 11% and 20% of physician income was withheld
pending review of utilization. See id.
See id. at 1746 (reporting that 75% of fee-for-service plans use some form of
salary withhold, as compared with 58% of plans with salaried physicians and 46% of
plans with capitated physicians). This reflects the additional financial incentive already inherent in a capitated payment system, which may make withholds redundant. See id. at 1747.
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panel MCO has a further incentive to contain costs to encourage the
MCO to retain the physician as a member of the panel and not to
"de-list" the provider because of her practice patterns.4
III. MANAGED CARE AND THIRD-PARTY PAYOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The types of conflicts of interest faced by physicians in managed
care plans will obviously vary with the type of MCO, "4 the specialty
practiced by the physician, 2 the type of payment system, 3 and the
specific terms of the contract between the MCO and the physician.
We can identify certain recurring conflicts of interest that arise regularly in the managed care setting. This part will explore these conflicts and the ethical dilemmas they create for managed care physicians.
A.

Types of Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care
1.

Conflict Between Individual Patient and Patient
Population

Conflicts between the individual patient and the patient population at large exist when the physician must care for a patient population out of a fixed pool of funds. Such a conflict occurs when a phy40 See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 604
(March 2, 1995) [hereinafter Rodwin, Conflicts]. This incentive will strengthen as
the percentage of the physician's patient population supplied by a single MCO
grows. Cf Robinson & Casalino, supra note 35, at 1685. For six studied capitated
medical groups, Robinson and Casalino found that a large percentage of their
HMO patients came from "a small number of large plans," with 55% to 72% of patients representing each group's largest three HMO contracts. See id. However,
these percentages were reduced by an average of 15% between 1990 and 1994, with
only one group experiencing greater concentration of its capitated patients, indicating that physician groups may be able at least partially to manage this risk. See id. at
tbl. 1.
41 See Clancy & Brody, supra note 5, at 338 ("[Quality managed care plans] are
more frequently found among the older staff model health maintenance organizations that were established in the 1940's through the 1960's, [while poor quality
plans are] more commonly found among the newest generation of managed care
organizations, often begun by insurers.").
42 Primary care physicians, because of their "gatekeeping" function, have been
subject to capitation payment systems more often than specialists. But see Kathy L.
Cerminara, Eliciting Patient Preferences in Today's Health Care System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1998) (noting proposals to reimburse primary care physicians on a fee-for-service basis while capitating specialists).
43 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN CAPITATION, REPORT 4-A-97 (1997) [hereinafter CEJA Report].
Direct capitation of individual physicians gives rise to certain financial incentives
not imposed by fee-for-service or by salary.
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sician is paid under a capitated system or when a fixed pool of funds
is set aside to cover the costs of care for a patient population." In
this situation, the physician must balance the present needs of the
individual patient against the potential future needs of the population. The physician must determine whether the benefit. to be
gained from full treatment of the individual's illness will outweigh
the potential detriment to the remainder of the patient population
through depletion of resources needed for treatment of future illnesses of others in the risk pool or across-the-board preventive
treatment.
2.

Conflict Between Patient and Physician's Financial
Interest

Conflicts between the patient's interest in receiving optimum
care and the physician's financial interest arise when the contract between the physician and the MCO puts the physician's income at risk
in the event that utilization exceeds set levels. This occurs under
contracts that provide for patient care and physician reimbursement
from one fixed pool of funds. Such a conflict exists in plans that pay
the physician through capitation or systems that create withholds
from income or bonuses to income tied to certain utilization levels.
The patient's interest in receiving treatment and the physician's interest in preserving her income level conflict because each dollar
spent on patient care commensurately decreases the physician's reimbursement. The patient's and physician's interests can also conflict in the absence of such an explicit relationship between expenditures on patient care and physician reimbursement, such as in plans
that create significant incentives for the physician to increase her income by participation in surpluses from specialty care pools set aside
by the MCO.
3.

Conflict Between Patient and Managed Care
Organization

Conflicts between the patient and the MCO occur when the organization establishes mechanisms for prospective utilization review,
such as employing a case manager to oversee certain types of diagnoses.' Ideally, case managers have as their prime motivation to improve the quality of patient care by making resources available for

"
45

See id.
See, e.g., Rodwin, Conflicts, supranote 40, at 606.
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lower-cost alternatives that will produce long-term savings.4 However, the fact that a case manager is employed by the managed care
organization produces incentives for the case manager to focus on
cost savings to the organization rather than on improved results to
the patient.4 In this situation, traditional medical ethics call for the
physician to act as the advocate for her patient to ensure that the patient's interests are represented." However, if the physician herself is
affected by a conflict of interest generated by a financial incentive to
place either her own or the managed care organization's interests
before that of the patient, the physician may feel obligated (or may
be contractually obligated)49 to remain silent in the face of the managed care organization's recommendations. At the least, the physician will have a disincentive to advocate her patient's cause with the
same zeal as would exist absent the conflict of interest.
B.

Responses to Third-PartyPayor Conflicts of Interest

Although the conflicts of interest we are concerned with have
generated widespread and consistent condemnation by medical
ethicists and commentators,"0 this condemnation is not reflected in
practicing physicians' rejection of contracts and other relationships
that generate these conflicts. The reasons for this failure on the part
of the profession to adhere to the ethical standards urged by its
leaders are several. First, although there is widespread condemnation in medical literature of fee and other arrangements that generate conflicts of interest, there has to date been no systematic attempt
to establish a framework for regulating these arrangements or to establish prohibitions against their use, either statutorily or through
ethical prohibitions.' Second, the economic bargaining power of
46 See id.
47 See id..

48 See AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 8.13(1).
49 See, e.g., AMA Calls on Managed Care Protiders to Cancel Gag Clauses
and Submit

Contractsfor Ethical Review (press release available at <http://www.ama-assn.org/adcom/releases/1 996/gagrule.htm>).
50 See, e.g., Alexander Leaf, The Doctor's Dilemma, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 718
(1984); Rodwin, Conflicts, supra note 40, at 605; Adam Yarmolinsky, Supporting the
Patient,332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 602, 603 (Mar. 2, 1995) ("The independence of physicians, as patients' advisors and advocates, is being impaired by business-owned
managed care companies.").
51

See RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS, supra note 27, at xiv-xvi.

One exception to

this statement is the conflict of interest generated by self-referral, which is regulated
by federal law but generally outside the scope of this Article, as it is not a conflict of
interest generated by an incentive to limit care. On the conflict of interest created
by self-referral generally, see id. at 67-82.
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individual physicians has been greatly diminished by managed care
reform in the private sector. Physicians in managed care markets often are forced to join managed care panels to maintain patient volume52 and have a powerful economic incentive not to act in ways that
would lead to delisting by the managed care organization.
1.

Response of the AMA to Third-Party Payor Conflicts of
Interest

The American Medical Association's (AMA) Code of Ethics"" has
dealt with conflicts of interest primarily through the mechanism of
disclosure and informed consent. According to the American Medical Society's Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, the right of the
patient to receive, and the corresponding duty of the physician to
provide, information regarding conflicts of interest is a fundamental
element of the physician-patient relationship." The physician may
not wait until a potential conflict has matured into an actual conflict
of interest before disclosing the existence of the conflict to the patient. "The patient has the right to receive information from physicians[,] ... to be advised of potential conflicts of interest that their
physicians might have, and to receive independent professional
opinions.""
The AMA Code of Ethics makes clear that the ethical duties of a
physician do not change simply because that physician practices in
an MCO instead of in a fee-for-service environment." Opinion 5.01
of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs states that
"[p] hysicians practicing in managed care organizations are subject to
the same ethical principles as are other physicians."5 7 Those ethical
principles require that the interest of the patient be placed above the

52 See Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman:
The Changing Politics of a Culturalicon, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 533, 548 (1997) ("As more patients are insured by HMOs,. . . doctors must virtually work for HMOs to have access to patients
who can pay.").
53 The AMA Code of Ethics and accompanying opinions are promulgated by
that body's Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs.
5
See AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at xli (Fundamental Elements of the
Physician-Patient Relationship item No. 1).
Id.
See id. at Opinion 5.01. However, commentators have noted the need to rethink the ethical duties of physicians because of the distinctly different pressures
and incentives produced by the managed care practice setting. See generally

MORREIM, supranote 5.
57

SeeAMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 5.01.
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physician's own interest. ' 8 If a conflict of interest does develop, ethical practice requires that it be resolved in favor of the patient.59
In June 1996, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
AMA issued Opinion 8.13 to address perceived ethical difficulties
caused by the expansion of managed care plans. Opinion 8.13 recognized the existence of incentives to deny care based on the financial relationship between a physician and a managed care organization and that such incentives create a conflict between the
physician's self-interest and her duty to her patients. 6 ' The AMA
stated that, because of such conflict, financial incentives are ethically
permitted "only if they promote the cost-effective delivery of health
care and not the withholding of medically necessary care." 62 While
the contours of the line between these two extremes are not entirely
clear, the Opinion offers three elements of guidance in assessing financial incentives.
First, "incentives to limit care must be disclosed fully to patients
by plan administrators." This disclosure must be made at the time of
enrollment in the plan and annually thereafter."
Second, the
"magnitude" of financial incentives should be limited, and the economic consequences should be determined by the practice patterns
of large groups of physicians rather than individuals." Finally, incentives based on the quality of care provided should be developed to
complement incentives based on the quantity of medical services
used.65
The cornerstone of the Opinion's approach to financial incentives is clearly disclosure to and consent by the patient. Disclosure is
the only one of the three guidelines that is mandatory. Although
plans "should" develop quality-based incentives and "should" measure physician behavior over large groups, they "must" provide initial
See id. at Opinion 8.03 ("Under no circumstances may physicians place their
own financial interests above the welfare of their patients."); id. at Opinion 8.13

("[In a managed care system,] physicians must continue to place the interests of
their patients first."); id. at Opinion 4.04 ("In a situation where the economic inter-

ests of [a] hospital are in conflict with patient welfare, patient welfare takes priority.").
59
60
61
62

63
65

See id.
See id. at Opinion 8.13(3).
See id.
Id.
SeeAMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 8.13(3)
(A).
See id.at Opinion 8.13(3) (B).
See id. at Opinion 8.13(3)(C). But see Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives,

supra
note 26, at 183-85 (explaining that the cost and practice difficulties associated with

quality-based incentives make such incentives unworkable).
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and subsequent annual disclosure to enrollees. Although the Opinion does not expressly mention obtaining the consent of the enrollee to the disclosed financial incentives, at least in the sense of
documenting that consent, consent is implicit in the disclosure requirement. If an enrollee does not consent to the financial incentives offered by the plan, she can express that lack of consent by refusing to enroll, opting instead for another provider of health
insurance or for another type of insurance policy offered by the
same insurer." Conversely, if an enrollee does in fact enroll (or stay
enrolled) after receiving disclosure, she can be said to have consented to the conflicts inherent in the financial incentives. 7
Although the Code of Ethics and Opinions thereunder are intended to "measure ethical behavior for the physician,"6 8 and "define
the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician,6 Opinion
8.13(3) curiously omits any reference to the physician's ethical duties
regarding financial incentives in managed care plans. The managed
care plan administrators are instructed to disclose financial incentives, health plans are encouraged to limit fee withholds and bonuses, and even patients are admonished to "be aware of the benefits
and limitations of their health care coverage," 70 but the ethical duty
of a physician practicing medicine under a managed care plan is nowhere expressly defined.71
In 1997, the Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs (CEJA) produced a report on the ethical implications of capitation,72 which was
subsequently adopted by the House of Delegates of the AMA- The
CEJA Report expands significantly upon the treatment of financial
conflicts of interest found in Opinion 8.13. The CEJA Report describes the effect of capitation on the role of the physician, and offers suggestions for ethical practice under capitated contracts. The
CEJA Report recognizes that capitation creates overlapping and conSee infra Part V-A. This view of informed consent rests on assumptions about
the range of insurance products available to the potential enrollee, which may or
may not be accurate. The enrollee may not have an effective choice of other forms
of health insurance, making the "consent" obtained problematic at best.
67 See, e.g., AMA Code of Ethics, supranote
2, at Opinion 9.06.
68
Id., Preface at ix (emphasis added).
69
Id., Principles, Preamble at xv (emphasis added).
70

Id. at Opinion 8.13(4).

Opinion 8.13(2) does impose on physicians a duty to "assure disclosure
of.. . financial inducements," but allows physicians to delegate this duty to a managed care plan by ensuring that adequate disclosures are made by plan administrators. Exactly how the physician is to secure this assurance is not clear. See id. at
Opinion 8.13(2).
72 See CEJA Report, supra note 43.
71
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flicting interests among patients in the capitated population. A physician providing services under a capitated contract, in addition to
the obligation "to act as advocate for the needs of each individual patient,"" has a strong incentive to consider the overlapping interests
of her other patients in the continued existence of adequate funding
for their future treatment needs. The CEJA Report expresses concern that capitation may potentially threaten the primacy of the physician's duty to individual patients by forcing the physician to consider the broader duty to conserve resources on an "equal or nearly
equal" basis with concern for the individual patient's well-being."
The CEJA Report offers concrete guidelines to physicians evaluating capitated provider agreements, with the aim of preserving the
primacy of the individual patient-physician relationship. According
to the CEJA Report, physicians should consider four factors when
evaluating a capitated contract. First, physicians have an obligation
to ensure that the plan's capitation rate is adequate to provide the
required medical services, taking into account any relevant characteristics of the patient population. 5 Second, physicians should evaluate
the level of financial risk posed to the physician by the proposed
contract. 76 Larger patient populations and physician groups, and
longer measuring periods, are preferred because of the reduced
volatility and increased predictability of costs over larger groups and
periods. Third, physicians should ensure that the contract provides
for adequate stop-loss protection to prevent an individual patient's
extraordinary medical costs from depleting the resources available
to, and thus impermissibly affecting the physician's treatment of, the
Finally, physicians should
remainder of the capitated population.
refuse to enter into contracts containing provisions that cannot be
discussed with patients without adversely affecting the
7 1 trust that the
relationship.
physician-patient
the
in
reposes
patient
Although the CEJA Report does not supersede Opinion 8.13,
and thus presumably the Council considers the disclosure obligation
of Opinion 8.13 applicable to capitated managed care plans, it appears that the Council is moving away from reliance on disclosure
and consent as the primary mechanism for policing managed care
relationships. The CEJA Report does not expressly require disclo7s
74
75
76

77
78

Id. at 6.

See id. at 2.

See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See CEJA Report, supra note 43, at 7.

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 29:95

sure of the details of the capitation scheme, or the incentives created
thereby, to patients. The primary burden is on the physician to
evaluate capitation proposals and to negotiate ethically acceptable
terms with the managed care organization. If the capitation rate is
insufficient, or if the financial risk assumed by the physician is inconsistent with the physician's overriding duty to advocate for the interests of individual patients, the physician has an ethical obligation to
refuse to enter into the agreement.80 This obligation provides an
additional level of protection beyond merely disclosing to the patient
the possibility that the physician's judgment may be affected by considerations of conservation of resources. It represents ajudgment on
the part of the Council that, as to capitated managed care plans,
some conflicts of interest are non-consentable.
Although Opinion 8.13 and the CEJA Report represent
thoughtful attempts to deal with the ethical problems raised by financial incentives to limit care, these guidelines do not have the
force of law. As guidelines adopted by a professional society, the
force of these rules, both within the profession and in the profession's relationships with third-party payors, is subject to question."
In some states, medical licensure laws treat violations of the
AMA Code of Ethics as grounds for discipline. However, this discipline has not always been forthcoming, even in states that expressly
so provide."s In order to ensure adoption of ethical guidelines, pressure must often be brought to bear from outside the profession."
The need for outside pressure is due to a combination of factors, including reluctance to discipline colleagues, professional loyalty, lack
of funding of disciplinary boards, and potential antitrust liability.8 '
If, in order to ensure enforcement of ethical guidelines, such guidelines must become law, we must next ask whether current laws satis-

79

See id. at 6. This shift in emphasis reflects the common criticism of consent-

based policing mechanisms that patients lack the knowledge and sophistication appropriately to evaluate complex health care delivery mechanisms and make rational, informed choices among them. See infra Part V-A.
80 See id. at 7; accord MoRREIM, supra note 5, at 94 ("[T] he individual physician
should not knowingly place his patients in institutions that will in turn, 'tie his
hands' and preclude him from delivering adequate care.").
81 See generally David Orentlicher, The Effect of a Professional Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583 (1994) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Physician Behavior].
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §4731.22 (B) (18) (Anderson 1997).
as See Orentlicher, Physician Behavior, supra note 81, at 604.
4 See id. at
603.
85 See id. at 604.
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factorily enforce ethical behavior. The next sections will consider
three potential sources of such enforcement.
2.

Response of the Health Care Financing Administration
to Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest

As we have seen, one of the strongest and most effective financial incentives available in managed care contracts is that which links
the physician's income to her practice pattern. With greater efficacy
as a financial incentive, however, comes a stronger conflict of interest, as the physician's income may depend on her individual treatment choices. This places the interest of the patient in full and complete treatment, no matter the ultimate cost to the insurer, at odds
with the interest of the physician in limiting expensive care to only
that which is absolutely necessary.
Recognizing the potential power of financial incentives that directly affect physician income, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has promulgated regulations that restrict the ability
of payors to impose such incentives on physicians in certain circumstances. Under HCFA regulations, 86 MCOs contracting with the
Medicaid and Medicare systems may not enter into physician incentive plans with their physicians that place physician income at
"substantial financial risk" based on physicians' referral practices and
patterns, without providing stop-loss insurance protection.
"Substantial Financial Risk" is defined by HCFA as placing over 25%
of physician income at risk for overuse of referral services .
The
MCO may either provide stop-loss protection through the purchase
of insurance on the market, or may provide stop-loss protection contractually.8 The final regulations allow imposition of sanctions" and
civil penalties of up to $25,000 per occurrence" for violation of these
provisions.
The regulations adopted by HCFA, like the CEJA Report, demonstrate a trend away from reliance on disclosure and consent as a
mechanism for policing managed care contracts. The regulations
require very limited disclosure by managed care plans.9" Disclosure is
See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1997).
See 61 Fed. Reg. 13,435 (March 27, 1996). If the financial incentives reach
only the services provided by the physician or physician group, the regulations do
not apply. See id.
See 42 C.F.R. § 41 7 .47 9(g) (2) (iii). The cost of commercial stop-loss insurance
may not be charged to the physician. See id.
See id. § 417.500.

90Seeid. § 1003.103(f)(1) (vi).
91

Cf Orentlicher, Physician Behavior, supra note 81, at 587 (stating that the rules
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only required to be made to Medicare beneficiaries, and it is only required upon the express request of a beneficiary.92 Finally, plans are
only required to disclose, even upon express request, the existence
and type of incentive used, whether stop-loss protection is provided,
and the results of any required enrollee satisfaction survey.' Clearly,
this limited disclosure is not consistent with an "informed consent"
model of managed care regulation. Further, it is inconsistent with
an "informed consent" model to limit the regulations to only those
incentives that affect referral practices. The primary policing mechanisms of the HCFA regulations are not disclosure and consent, but
rather the requirement of stop-loss protection and quality assessment procedures.
The HCFA regulations recognize the need for patient protection from managed care contracting practices. They recognize that,
if left unregulated, the market for managed health care services will
impose incentives that are considered to be too strong - i.e., those
that threaten to disincentivize physicians from providing care that is
appropriate and necessary. However, these regulations apply only in
very limited circumstances. They apply only to financial incentives
that attempt to restrict physicians' referrals to specialists. A financial
incentive that operates to restrict the care provided by individual
physicians is outside the scope of the regulations. For this reason,
the existing regulations are insufficient to address fully the conflicts
of interest discussed above.
3.

Potential ERISA Relief

The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)9 regulates "employee welfare benefit plans," defined by
statute to include employer-provided health plans. 95 ERISA imposes
a fiduciary duty on administrators of covered plans.
In the 1997
97
case of Shea v. Esenstein, the Eighth Circuit held that a plan that did
not disclose financial incentives that discouraged primary care physicians from making referrals to specialists violated its fiduciary duty to
a plan beneficiary.

are "evidence that the federal government is insufficiently concerned about finan-

cial incentives [to limit care]").
92 See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(h)
(3).
93 See id. § 417.479(h)
(3) (i-iv).
94 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453
(1988).
95 See id. § 1002(1)(A).
See id. § 1104.

97 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.

Ct. 297 (1997).
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Patrick Shea visited his family physician complaining of chest
pains. Mr. Shea's family had a history of heart disease, and Mr. Shea
himself had been hospitalized with chest pains during a recent business trip abroad. Despite his clinical symptoms, Mr. Shea's physician
refused to refer him to a cardiologist, claiming that Mr. Shea was
"too young" and "did not have enough symptoms" to justify such a
referral. 98 Mr. Shea subsequently died of heart failure."
Under the provider agreement between Mr. Shea's insurer,
Medica, and his primary care physician, the physician was under an
incentive to reduce the number of referrals to specialists. The physician could both receive a bonus for limiting such referrals and could
suffer a reduction in income for over-referring.'"0 Mr. Shea's widow
sued Medica, alleging that its failure to disclose this fee structure materially affected her husband's decision not to disregard his physician's advice and see a cardiologist on his own initiative.
The Eighth Circuit considered the issue of whether a failure on
the part of Medica to disclose its physician compensation structure
violated its fiduciary duty to Mr. Shea under ERISA_ According to
Eighth Circuit precedent, the duty requires disclosure of "material
facts which could adversely affect a plan member's interests." 2° In
reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Medica, the court concluded that a "financial incentive scheme put
in place to influence a treating doctor's referral practices when the
patient needs specialized care is certainly a material piece of information."' °'
Shea is not yet old enough to determine whether the disclosure
obligation articulated therein will enjoy widespread acceptance by
courts. 01 4 Even if Shea were accepted by all federal jurisdictions, howM
T

98 Id. at 626.
9
'00

See id.
See id. at 627.

101 See id.
102

Id. at 628 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 36 F.3d 746, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1994),

aftd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996)).
03 See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
104
See, e.g., Drolet v. HealthSource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.H. 1997). In
New Hampshire, a class action is pending against Healthsource, Inc. under a Shealike theory. The plaintiffs in Drolet allege that a plan that disclosed to its enrollees
that their "physician has a contractual relationship with Healthsource which does
not interfere with the exercise of the physician's independent medical judgment" is
in breach of its fiduciary duty where the plan's primary care physicians can earn up
to 33% of their base salaries by judicious use of specialty services. See id. But see
Weiss v. CignaHealthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y 1997), in which the District
Court held that "CIGNA... has no duty to disclose the nature of its compensation
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ever, the holding provides insufficient protection to managed care
enrollees for two reasons. First, it suffers from the same defects as
other disclosure and consent mechanisms.'0 5 Even if Patrick Shea
could have paid for a cardiologist's services from his own resources,
this would not be true for all enrollees, or for all medical services.
Second, the remedy available for breach of the ERISA fiduciary
duty is not clear. ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" ERISA
1
plans. 06
ERISA statutory remedies thus constitute the sole available
remedies for violations of the statute. Shea does not address the
question of appropriate remedies for such a breach. Drolet v. HealthSource, Inc., states in dicta that "if [the plan] made material misrepresentations ... it can be enjoined under ERISA to prevent further
breaches of its fiduciary duty."' 7 Such an injunction would surely be
a singularly unsatisfying remedy for a plaintiff harmed by a plan's
failure to disclose unreasonable conflicts of interest.
4.

Proposed Patient "Bills of Rights"

Recent perceptions of abusive contracting practices by managed
care organizations have inspired a "consumer protection" approach
to managed care regulation by some commentators and policymakers.
One result of this consumer protection movement has been
the proliferation of legislative "Patient Bills of Rights." In 1997,
President Clinton appointed a Presidential Commission to study the
issue of patient protection in the managed care marketplace. This
Commission recommended a Patient Bill of Rights on November 20,
1997.'
The Commission affirmed that patients have the right to
make medical decisions based on full information. Nonetheless,
commentators have recognized that, for patients enrolled in managed care plans that impose financial incentives to limit care on physicians, the right of disclosure is insufficient protection."0 Writing in
agreements with its physicians," expressly declining to follow Shea and Drolet. Id. at
754-55 & n.6. Note also that Drolet did not address mere non-disclosure, as did Shea,
but alleged affirmative misrepresentation.
:05 See infra Part V-A.
06 See29 U.S.C. §
1144(a) (1988).
107 Drolet, 968 F. Supp. at 761.
108 See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are

the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007 (1996) [hereinafter Rodwin, Consumer Protection].
IN See ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE HELTH
CARE INDUSTRY, CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 20, 1997). See generally George J. Annas, A

NationalBill of Patients'Rights, 338 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 695 (Mar. 5, 1998).

110 See Annas, supra note 109, at 697 ("[Ilt is pretty thin gruel to guarantee
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the New England Journal of Medicine, George Annas has suggested
that an effective national patients' bill of rights must include the
right to know about all financial incentives that will affect care," as
1
well as the right to an advocate within the health care system.
Clearly, the Commission's recommendations focus on disclosure and
consent as a means of curing the ethical problems posed by financial
incentives to limit care. However, mere disclosure and consent,
without more, may be ineffective to ameliorate these ethical problems.'"
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THIRD-PARTY PAYOR CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

Third-party payor relationships are not as common in law as in
medicine. This may be due to the relatively limited access that most
individuals have to legal services, the greater value placed by most
individuals on health care than legal representation, or a lesser need
for legal services on the part of most individuals as compared to
healthcare services. Although third-party payor conflicts of interest
are less common in law than in medicine, the legal profession has
generated an enormous body of scholarship, commentary and regulation addressing the problems generated by these conflicts of interest. Third-party payor conflicts in the legal profession commonly
arise in three areas:1 4 insurance defense work, ' criminal defense
work, ' 6 and prepaid legal service plans."' This section will examine
the settings in which the existence of third-party payors generates
[managed care enrollees] access to the contracts they or their employer signed.").
II See id. at 698.
11
See id.
11
See infra Part V-A.
114 One commentator has identified a fourth
third-party payor relationship with
the potential to create conflicts of interest: that of the attorney who is hired by a
parent to represent the interests of a minor. See Sabrina S. Long, Comment, The
Attorney-Child Relationship- Do the Parents or the Child Control?. 20J. LEGAL PROF. 287
(1996). The author identifies a minority position that argues for self-determination
for children independent of parental determinations of the child's best interest and
reversal of the presumption of incompetence. See id. at 291. If accepted by courts
and legislatures, this position could create conflicts of interest where the attorney
for the child is faced with conflicting instructions from the child and the parents as
to the course of the representation. Because the vast majority of courts and legislatures agree that parental control of this representation in accordance with paternal
determinations as to the best interests of the child is appropriate in the absence of a
finding of paternal unfitness, and no movement away from this standard has been
identified, this Article will engage in no further discussion of this potential conflict.
15
See infra Part V-B-1.
116 See infa Part V-B-2.
17
See infra Part V-B-3.
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conflicts of interest for lawyers, and it will explore the profession's
response to these conflicts in each of the areas identified.
A.

EthicalDuties of Lawyers

The American Bar Association has promulgated the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules),18 which have been
adopted, often with variations, by the supreme courts of more than
36 states"' as the governing standards of the legal profession. These
rules of professional ethics offer practicing lawyers guidance in dealing with conflicts of interest arising from, inter alia, questionable
payment procedures. 20 This section will describe two duties articulated in the Model Rules that apply to third-party payor conflicts of
interest.
1.

Duty to Obtain Informed Consent from the Client

The concept of informed consent is central to the Model Rules'
treatment of lawyers' conflicts of interest. The foundation of legal
informed consent in the Model Rules is Rule 1.4(b), which requires
that
[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation. 121
This general requirement is given specific application in the
Model Rules relating to third-party payor conflicts of interest. '2 Rule
1.7(b) permits lawyers to represent clients, even in the face of a potential conflict of interest, if the client consents to the representation
after consultation'2 and the lawyer reasonably believes that the po-

lls See Model Rules, supra note 2.
119 See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D.

SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:

STATUrS

(1996).
,20 See Model Rules, supra note 2, at Preamble, 18.
121 See id. at Rule 1.4(b).
1
The concept of informed consent is used by the Model Rules to deal with
ethical problems other than conflicts of interest. See, for example, Model Rules,
supra note 2, at Rule 1.8(b), which provides: "A lawyer shall not use information
relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted by [the Rules]."
123 The consent that is contemplated by the Rules is
full disclosure of all facts
that give rise to the conflict of interest. See Sharon K Hall, Note, Confusion Over
AND STANDARDS 3

Conflicts of Interest: Is There a Bright Line for Insurance Defense Counse4 41 DRAKE L.

REV. 731, nn. 260-64 and accompanying text (1992) ("To satisfy her duty to the insured, an attorney must communicate all relevant information regarding actual or
potential conflicts with the insurance company.").
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24
tential conflict will not in fact adversely affect the representation.
Model Rule 1.8(f) similarly allows third-party payor fee agreements
where the client consents after consultation, provided that both the
lawyer's independent
professional judgment and client confidential2

ity are protected.

2.

1

Duty to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment

Professional ethics impose on the lawyer the duty to maintain
the primacy of the client's interest in the representation, necessarily
limited by the bounds of the law and ethical practice.' 26 Under the
Model Rules, it is the client, not the lawyer or any third party, who
may define the scope of the representation'" and make substantive
decisions regarding the goals of the representation. 2 8
In order to act effectively according to the client's direction
within the bounds of the law and ethical practice a lawyer must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client.
This duty is expressed in several of the Model Rules. Most directly,
Model Rule 2.1 provides in relevant part: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment."'29 The
Model Rules recognize that independence of professional judgment
is particularly at risk in the presence of potential conflicts of interest.
Model Rule 1.7(b) provides:
SeeModel Rules, supra note 2, at Rule 1.7(b).
See id. at Rule 1.8(f). Client confidentiality is protected primarily by Model
Rule 1.6, which provides: "Alawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation" and
except for certain narrowly drawn circumstances. The ethical duty of confidentiality
is broader than the evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege. See id. at Rule 1.6,
cmt. 5. This broader duty of confidentiality is justified by its promotion of full and
frank disclosure from clients to lawyers "even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." Id. at Rule 1.6, cmts. 2,4.
26 See id. at Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."); id. at Rule
1.16(a) (A lawyer must withdraw if continuing the representation would violate the
Rules). However, even upon withdrawal, the lawyer has a duty to minimize the impact of the withdrawal on the client's case, by giving the client advance notice sufficient to enable the client to seek and obtain alternate representation. See id. at Rule
1.16(d).
1
Id. at Rule 1.2(a) provides that: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation..."; see also Comment to Model Rule
1.2(c) ("The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by
the legal representation.").
128 See Model Rules, supra note 2, at Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide
by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.").
124
125

129

Id. atRule 2.1.
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A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. 30
Further, the Model Rules recognize that agreements by which a
third party pays the legal fees of a client represent a conflict of interest and a threat to the independence of the lawyer's professional
judgment. Model Rule 1.8(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship;
and
(3) information relating to rearesentation of a client is pro[the Rules].
tected as required by
Similarly, on the subject of third-party payors, Model Rule 5.4(c)
amplifies the prohibition in 1.8(0. Even if the representation passes
muster under 1.8(f), 5.4(c) still applies to require that "[a] lawyer...
not permit a person who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.""'
B.

Third-PartyPayor Conflicts of Interest in InsuranceDefense Work

Nearly every policy of liability insurance sold in the United
States provides protection to the insured not only against the cost of
liability for negligence, but also against the cost of legal fees incurred
in defending against a claim that is covered under the policy.'
In
other words, liability insurance policies impose upon the insurer
both a duty to indemnify and a duty to defend.TM The duty to defend
IS
131
132

1

Id. at Rule 1.7(b).

Id. at Rule 1.8(f).

Id. at Rule 5.4(c).
See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LiABILyr

COVERAGE FoRM

Part I-A (1992). The Insurance Services Office ("ISO") drafts policy forms that are
used for the majority of commercial general liability policies sold. See id. The duty
to defend is stated in the ISO standard form policy. See id.
' See Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of InsuranceDefense Ethics,
9 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 477 (1996) (hereinafter Richmond, Eternal Triangle).
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protects the interests of both insurer and insured. It provides the insured with additional protection against unexpected and potentially
ruinous costs. Further, it provides the insurer with an opportunity to
reduce the costs of claims and litigation by negotiating with defense
counsel for lower fees, using experienced and capable counsel repeatedly and exerting control over the litigation strategy used by defense counsel so as to minimize the company's exposure. Indeed,
insurers see the defense of the insured not as a burden, but as a deStandard liability insurance policies are
sired cost-saving device.'
written to specify that the insurer has not only a duty, but the "right"
to defend the action, ' 36 so that the insured cannot normally decline
the insurer-provided defense and still expect indemnity. Insureds'
participation in the insurer-sponsored defense is further ensured
through use of "cooperation clauses" conditioning coverage of the
underlying loss on the insured's cooperation with the insurer in the
defense of the action.157
Because it provides the insurer with a means to minimize aggregate losses, and offers the insured the opportunity for a legal defense
at no cost,3 the duty to defend seems at first glance to be a win-win
situation. Although in the vast majority of cases it does in fact work
to the benefit of all parties, ' " in a significant minority of cases it creates a serious problem for the parties to the insurance contract, as
well as for the insurance defense lawyer.'4° The interests of the insured and insurer do not always coincide. Although both parties are
nominally interested in minimizing the amount of loss, their perspectives and interests are distinctly different. This section will ex-

135

See Hall, supra note 123, at 733.

13 See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 133,

§ I.A. l.a.
See id. § IV.2.c.3.
Iss See Richmond, Eternal Triangle, supra note 134, at 481 ("[Ilnsured's
desire to
secure a defense against third party claims is probably as great a motive for purchasing liability insurance as is the need for potential indemnity. Indeed, liability insurance is essentially 'litigation insurance.'").
137

139 See id.
("Both insurer and insured benefit by the insurer's selection of counsel."). The generally advantageous nature of this tripartite relationship is reflected

in the fact that there is no general ethical prohibition against a lawyer representing
both insurer and insured in defense of a third party action against the insured, so
long as the lawyer defends the insured with "undivided fidelity." See ABA CoMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FoRMAL OPINION 282 (1950).
140 For discussion of ethical issues in insurance defense work that are
outside the
scope of this Article, see generally Richmond, Eternal Triangle, supra note 134; Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers,

45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995).
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plore some of the1 4 conflicts of interest created by this third-party
payor relationship. 1
1.

Coverage Disputes

First, the insurance defense attorney may experience a conflict
of interest when the interests of the insurer and the insured diverge
in the course of the representation. Consider a hypothetical automobile accident complaint alleging both that the defendant driver
negligently operated his vehicle, causing injury to the plaintiff, and
alleging as a separate basis for recovery that the defendant driver intentionally operated his vehicle so as to injure the plaintiff. Under
the standard industry automobile insurance policy, the former claim
is covered 2 while the latter claim is not.4 Although the insurer has
a duty to defend the lawsuit,'" if a finding of liability is inevitable or
likely, the insurer would prefer a determination that the injury was
caused intentionally by its insured, rather than negligently. Thus, in
this situation, the insurer's and insured's interests are in conflict.
Because the lawyer representing the insured is hired and paid by the
insurer, and because the lawyer knows that the insurer represents a
continuing source of business while the insured does not,

4
5

there is

the potential for violation of the lawyer's independence of professional judgment on behalf of the insured.'"
2.

Alternate Fee Agreements

Just as MCOs were created to address the rapid rise in the cost
of health care insurance, so liability insurers are increasingly concerned about the rising cost of liability insurance coverage. Just as
health insurers seek controls on the cost of medical services, liability
insurers seek controls on the cost of the legal services provided by
them under liability insurance contracts. The reservation of the
141 For a more comprehensive look at traditional
and emerging conflicts of interest in this field, see Douglas R. Richmond, Emerging Conflicts of Interest in Insurance
Defense Practice,32 TORT & INS. L.J. 69 (1996) [hereinafter Richmond, Emerging Conflicts].
142 See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PERSONAL AUTo PoLicy,
PART A LtABiLrY
COVERAGE, INSURING AGREEMENT § A (1988).
143 See id. at Exclusions
§ A. 1.
144 See ROWLAND H. LONG, 1 THE LAW OF LIABiLTy INSURANCE
§ 5.02 (1997). The
duty to defend attaches whenever the complaint states a cause of action that is covered under the policy, even if the complaint also states causes of action not covered.
See id. The duty does not terminate until it is conclusively established that no potential theory of recovery would be covered under the policy. See id.
145 See Richmond, Eternal Triangle, supra note 134, at
483.
146 See Model Rules, supra note 2,
at Rule 5.4(c).
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"right" to defend any covered claim brought against the insured is an
example of this control, as it brings the scope of the litigation within
the control of the insurer. Recently, insurers have begun to explore
further means to reduce the cost of litigating covered claims. These
means include flat fee arrangements, practice guidelines for outside
counsel employed by insurers to represent their insureds, and the
increased use of salaried lawyers, employed by the insurer, to represent insureds.
a.

Flat Fee Agreements

In recent years, lawyers have come under pressure from clients
to accept "alternative" fee arrangements. These alternative arrangements generally involve discounted hourly rates in exchange for an
increased (or not reduced) volume of work from that client or "flat"
fees paid by the client to cover all, or a specified range of, legal services that the client may require for a given period of time. In 1994, a
group of insurers asked the Kentucky Bar Association's Board of
Governors to respond to the following question: May a lawyer enter
into a contract with a liability insurer in which the lawyer or
47 his firm
agrees to do all of the insurer's defense work for a set fee?1
The Board concluded that the proposed fee arrangement would
violate Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(f)(2) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct because it would improperly shift the risk of additional legal costs to the lawyer and would provide the lawyer with an
incentive to limit the services rendered to the policyholders whom
the lawyer would be retained to represent.'4 8 Upon issuance of this
opinion, the insurers filed a motion in the Kentucky Supreme Court
seeking review of this ethics opinion. 4 9 The Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed and adopted the ethics opinion, holding that, in
Kentucky, an insurance defense lawyer or firm may not enter into a
fee agreement with an insurer obligating that lawyer or firm to perform legal services for the insurer's policyholders at a fixed rate unconnected to the actual amount of work performed. Such agreements were held to violate Rule 1.7(b), in that the attorney under
such an agreement "has an interest in the outcome of the action
which conflicts with the duties owed to the client." In other words,
17

See KENTUCKY ADVISORY ETHICS OPINION: KBA E-368, in KENTUCKY BENCH
& BAR

52 (Fall 1994).
148 See id. ("[T]o some extent the lawyer becomes the insurer, and [the] lawyer
stands to gain by limiting the services rendered to the client.").
149 See American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568,
569 (Ky.
1996).

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 29:95

the lawyer will have an interest in disposing of each action in as little
time as possible in order to maximize the lawyer's profit from the fee
agreement and in order to devote more time to the lawyer's other,
non-fixed fee clients."' Such agreements also violate Rule 1.8(f)(2),
because the conflict of interest created by the fixed fee payment interferes with the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of the insured client.'
It is important to note that the Kentucky Supreme Court did
not premise its rejection of fixed fee agreements on the existence of
an actual conflict of interest between the insured and the attorney.
The court held that consent to the potential conflict of interest created by the fixed fee agreement was insufficient to cure the appearance of impropriety suggested by such an agreement. The court
stressed that "the mere appearance of impropriety is just as egregious as any actual or real conflict" and stated that "[the ethics opinion adopted] acts as a prophylactic device to eliminate the potential
for a conflict of interest or the compromise of an attorney's ethical
and professional duties."'" Even if all parties involved desire such an
agreement, 53 the interest of the Supreme Court in protecting the integrity of the legal profession and the avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety in lawyer-client relationships justifies rejection of
such fee agreements.
The Kentucky Supreme Court opinion has not yet been followed by any other jurisdictions and its future influence remains to
be determined.5 The legal profession has in the past shown considerable flexibility in allowing lawyers to enter into alternative fee
agreements. The American Bar Association opined in 1972 that
"[n]o reasonable method of fixing fees which takes into account the
factors enumerated in DR 2-106(B) is proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility."' 5 Speaking to the precise issue of fixed fees
150
151

See id. at 572.
See id.

Id. at 573.
Fixed fee agreements have very substantial potential benefits from
the point
of view of all parties to the tripartite relationship. The insurer would desire a fixed
fee agreement because of its role in controlling defense costs. The lawyer would
desire such an agreement because of its role as a guarantee of further work from
the insurer. Finally, the client insured would desire such an agreement because of
its interest in the lower insurance premiums that would accompany a reduction in
defense costs.
1
See Richmond, Emerging Conflicts, supranote 141,
at 82.
152
153

155 STANDING COMMFITEE ON ETHics AND PRoFEssioNAL
REsPONSIBILrIY, FORMAL AND

ABA FoRMALIOP. 329 (1985). DR 2-106(B) requires that
a lawyer, in setting the amount of the fee, consider (1) the time, labor and skill reINFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS,
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for insurance defense work, the state bars of Oregon,'5 Wisconsin,
and New Hampshire'" have issued opinions that expressly permit
lawyers in those states to enter into agreements with insurers to undertake the legal defense of insureds for fixed fees.
b.

Practice Guidelines

According to one commentator, liability insurers who contract
with outside counsel to provide legal services to their insureds may,
as part of the contract with outside counsel, require that such counsel act within the scope of practice guidelines developed by the insurer in an effort to contain the costs of litigation.
This approach
represents another cost-containment mechanism implemented by
liability insurers; unfortunately, it, too, presents the lawyer involved
with an ethical dilemma when the practice guidelines proscribe services the lawyer believes would benefit the insured client. Such guidelines may cause the lawyer-insured relationship to violate Model Rule
1.8(f), if the practice guidelines interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment,161 or Model Rule 1.7, if the guidelines impose material limitations on the representation and the lawyer does not reasonably believe that the representation can avoid being adversely
affected by those material limitations.' 6' In either case, the limitation
on the scope of work authorized by the payor must be fully disclosed
to the insured, and the insured's consent to this limitation on the
representation must be obtained. 6 2 The practice guidelines may also
cause the lawyer to violate Model Rule 5.4(c), requiring that the law-

quired for the task; (2) the likelihood that the lawyer will forego other work; (3)
customary fees charged for similar work; (4) the amount involved and results obtained; (5) any time limitations on the work; (6) the professional relationship with
the client; (7) the experience and reputation of the lawyer performing the services;
and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSiaILrY, DR 2-106(B) (1974) [hereinafter Model CodeI. Nothing in this list
of factors necessarily precludes an attorney from entering into a fixed fee agreement with an insurer; indeed, factor eight expressly contemplates fixed fee agreements in at least some circumstances. See id.
15

See LEGAL. ETHICS COMMrIEE OF THE OREGON STATE BAR ASS'N., FoRMAL
Op.

1991-98 (1991).

See STATE BAR OF WiscoNsiN, Op. E-83-15 (1983).
15 See ETHICS COMMrrE OF THlE NEw HAMPSHIRE BAR ASS'N, FORMAL OP.
1990157

91/5 (1991).
159
16

161
162

See Richmond, Emerging Conflicts, supra note 141, at 82-86.
See Model Rules, supra note 2, at Rule 1.8(0(2).

Seeid. atRule 1.7(b)(1).
See id. at Rule 1.7(b) (2); Rule 1.8(0 (1).
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yer not permit a third-party payor to "direct or regulate" the lawyer's
professional judgment."'
c.

In-House Counsel

Perhaps the ultimate cost-cutting mechanism for liability insurers obligated to provide legal services to their insureds is to use lawyers employed by the insurer to defend the insureds, often referred
to as "house counsel" or "in-house counsel."'" This approach allows
insurers to eliminate the variability of outside counsel fees without
resorting to fixed fee agreements and the potential incentive to provide fewer services than necessary. 65 State bar association ethics
committees and courts have established conflicting positions on the
appropriateness of an in-house attorney employed by an insurance
company representing that company's insureds in litigation of covered claims.
Some state bar associations have stated in ethics opinions that
an insurer may provide defense of covered claims to its insureds
through in-house counsel. In 1987, the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the California State Bar
(Committee) opined that such a defense does not violate the Code
of Professional Responsibility, so long as four conditions are met:
The attorney must take care that the insurance company employer
does not control or interfere with the attorney's professional judgment on behalf of the insured; 66 the attorney must not split legal
fees with the insurance company;167 cases that present actual conflicts
of interest must be referred to outside counsel;'" and the letterhead

163 See id. at Rule 5.4(c). For a more thorough description of this and other potential ethical violations inherent in practice guidelines, see Richmond, Emerging
Conflicts, supra note 141, at 83-86.
1 See generally Robert J. Johnson, In-House Counsel Employed by Insurance Companies: A Difficult Dilemma Confronting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 57

OHIO ST. L.J. 945 (1996).
165 See CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND

CONDUCr, FORMAL OPINION NUMBER 1987-91 ("It is believed that the cost

of the [in-house attorneys] will be substantially less than the cost of retaining outside counsel to provide such a defense.").
'6
See id. at 4.
167 See id. at 5. The Committee noted that normally, fee-splitting will not be an
issue, since the attorney's salary is paid by the insurer. See id. However, where legal
costs of a defense are chargeable against an insured's deductible, the Committee
noted that the insurer must not profit from the collection of such deductible. See
id. at n.3.
16 See id. at
5.
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used by the in-house attorneys must indicate the relationship between the attorneys and the insurer.
The opinion of the California State Bar reflects a desire to allow
legal ethics to reflect the changing marketplace for legal services.
The Committee rejected a line of cases holding that a corporation
that employs an attorney to render legal services for another is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The Committee noted
that "[t]he foregoing case law has not outlasted the evolution of
prepaid medical and legal services programs which, under these
authorities, would theoretically violate the prohibition against corporations practicing law.". 9 The change in the marketplace for professional services is thus used as one ground for authorizing a change in
professional ethics.
The California opinion also reflects a charitable view of the tripartite relationship among the insurer, insured, and lawyer. While
acknowledging the lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the insured, the Committee notes that
"the mere fact that the lawyers are employees of Insurance Company
does not necessarily compromise the attorney's independent professional judgment." While many states cite the inherent potential conflict of interest in refusing to permit in-house lawyers to represent insureds, 7 , the California Bar believes that this potential conflict is
manageable, even if the lawyer is an employee of the insurer. "[I]n
absence of [an actual] conflict of interest ....it cannot be presumed

that simply because the attorneys handling defense cases are salaried
employees of Insurance Company that they will act unethically.''
This statement, combined with the Committee's direction that
"[w]hen the interests of the insurer and the insured diverge to the
point that a conflict of interest is deemed to exist, the attorney must
advise both the insurer and the insured of the conflict and must, in
absence of written consent of both parties, withdraw from the representation," is significant. The Committee appears to be taking the
position that a mere potential conflict of interest does not trigger
the duty to disclose and obtain consent, and appears not to recognize the conflict of interest between the lawyer's duty to the insured
as a client and the lawyer's own interest in continued employment by
the insurer.172 This is troublesome, as it raises the possibility that an
169 Id.

at 2.

170 See

infranotes 175-180 and accompanying text.

171 CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDING

AND CONDUCT, FORMAL OPINION NUMBER
172

See supraPart IV-B-1.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1987-91 at 3.
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insured may enter into a lawyer-client relationship with an in-house
attorney without realizing the scope of the potential conflict of interest until that potential matures into an actual conflict, by which
time the disclosure and consent required by the Committee may be
insufficient. The only protection for the insured client at the time
the lawyer-client relationship is formed is the requirement that the
lawyer's letterhead contain a reference to the relationship between
the lawyer and the insurer. The Committee advises that "[f]or example, the letterhead could contain an asterisk identifying the firm
as the Law Division for Insurance Company.""' This disclosure does
not rise to the
level of the "full disclosure" contemplated by the
4
Model Code.1

Other states consider representation of insureds by in-house
lawyers to be ethically impermissible. The North Carolina State Bar
has stated that it is unethical for an in-house lawyer to defend a covered claim on behalf of an insured, as well as jointly to defend both
the insurer and the insured in a declaratory judgment action that
names both as defendants.17 The representation of the insured by a
lawyer-employee of the insurer was held to be the unauthorized practice of law, because the insured, not the insurer, is the real party in
interest.' 76 The opinion also noted that a lawyer who is the employee
77
of an insurer is "subject to the direct control of [the] employer,"'
who is not subject to the ethical duties of a licensed lawyer. The
opinion notes that this divided loyalty dilutes the lawyer's obligation
to the true client, the insured. The opinion, unlike the California
opinion discussed above, takes notice of the potential for conflict
inherent in the relationship between the insurer and the in-house
lawyer and notes that "the conflict.., is thus as much a function of

17s

CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDING COMMITTEE

ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILriY

AND CONDUCT, FORMAL OPINION NUMBER 1987-91 at 6; see also NEWJERSEY SUPREME
COURT COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE, SUPPLEMENT TO OPINION NUMBER

23

(August 26,1996) ("[N]ot having been presented with any information that failure
to disclose [the employment relationship between the lawyer and the insurer] has
resulted in harm to the insureds, [we] are therefore reluctant to suggest that disclosure be required.").
174 See Model Code, supra note 2, at DR 5-107(A). At least one other state, while
also allowing in-house lawyers to defend insureds, provides more protection to the
insured at the outset of the relationship.
See PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONCERNS OF
INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH COMMENTS APPROPRIATE TO STAFF TRIAL LAW'ERs,

FORMAL OPINION NUMBER 96-196 (April 18, 1997).
175 See NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, OPINION RPC 151 (April 15, 1993).
176
Cf Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1986).
7 NORTH CAROLINASTATE BAR, OPINION

RPC

151 at 1 (April 15, 1993).
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the relationship of the insurance company, in-house counsel, and
the insured as the actual difference in their interests in the particular
litigation.',18 Even if the insurer and insured actually have no conflict of interest in a particular case, "the problem of the 'diluted responsibility' to the client.., will continue to exist.", 7 In evaluating
whether in-house counsel may represent the insurer in litigation, the
North Carolina State Bar asks whether the insurer or the insured is
the real party in interest in the litigation. If the insured is the real
party in interest, then the lawyer is acting on behalf of the insured,
an ethically impermissible conflict.
C. Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in CriminalDefense Work
In addition to insurance defense work, attorneys who practice in
the criminal defense area are often confronted with offers by third
parties to pay for the legal defense costs of clients. These third parties include corporations offering (or who are contractually obligated) to pay legal fees for executive employees, multiple defendants
collectively paying one attorney to defend each of them, cities paying
for the defense of police officers, and "crime bosses" paying the defense fees of indicted colleagues.'
Just as financial incentives in health care create conflicts by increasing the influence of the payor in physician-patient decisions, in
cases where a third party is paying the fee of a criminal defense lawyer, the prosecution may charge that the tripartite relationship creates a situation in which the payor exerts undue influence over the
acts of the attorney, who is ethically obligated to act solely in the best
interest of his client.' s' In these cases, even if the client consents to
the representation after full disclosure, courts are often reluctant to
accept the client's waiver of conflict-free representation because of
812
the courts' interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety.
Clearly, in this context the law recognizes that mere disclosure and
consent is inadequate fully to protect the client and safeguard the
ethical standards of the profession.

178

Id. at 2.

179

Id.

180 See Roman M. Roszkewycz, Note, Third Party Payment of Criminal Defense Fees:

What Lauryers Should Tell Potential Clients and Their Benefactors Pursuant to (An
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 573, 574-75 (1993).

Amended) Model Rule 1.8(J), 7
181 Seeid. at 576-81.
182

See id. at 584-86.
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D. Third-PartyPayor Conflicts of Interest in PrepaidLegal Service
Plans
In law, unlike medicine, prepayment of legal expenses through
insurance or some other prepayment plan is uncommon. The vast
majority of legal services are provided on an individually negotiated
hourly-rate, fee-for-service basis. The concept of prepaid legal services, however, is gaining some currency, and the number of people
covered by some sort of prepaid legal service plan is increasing, from
fewer than one million in 197618 to an estimated 18.5 million in
1994.'" Although these plans have not yet gained the pervasiveness
of prepaid health insurance, 85 they exist and can be expected to
grow as the legal marketplace attempts to market legal services to a
greater number of consumers. 6 Although favorable tax treatment
for employer-provided legal service plans lapsed in 1992, 187 prepaid
legal service plans are expressly recognized as employee welfare
plans in federal legislation regulating such plans,'" paving the way
for more extensive use of prepaid legal services for Americans unable
to access the legal system through the traditional channels of fee-forservice and contingency.'"

183 See Wayne Moore & Monica Kolasa, AARP Legal Services Network: Expanding
Legal Services To The Middle Class, 32 WAK FoREST L. REv. 503, 512 (1997).
. SeeJennifer Dahlgren, Consulting the Future, 80 A.B.A. J. 76, 77 (April 1994).
For another estimate, see Ronald Glantz, Building Your Small Firm Practice on a Prepaid Foundation, 68 FLA. B.J. 48, 48 (Jan. 1994) (estimating that 71 million Americans are covered by legal service plans).
185 See Vemetta L. Walker, Legal Needs Of The Public In The Future,
71 FLA. B.J. 42,
44 (May 1997) (stating that legal service plans, although authorized by the Florida
bar, "have not really taken off.").
186 See Robert N. Wilentz, Speeches by ChiefJustice Robert N. Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS
L.
RE'v. 757, 759-60 (1997) (reprinting 1979 speech predicting "a growing demand for
the delivery of legal services at prices all can afford, for group legal services, for
prejgaid legal services."); see also Glantz, supra note 184, at 48.
See 42 U.S.C. § 120 (1997) (providing for an exclusion from gross income of
amounts contributed by an employer on behalf of an employee and dependents
under a qualified group legal services plan); 42 U.S.C. § 501(c)(20) (1997)
(exempting from federal income taxation an organization or trust created as part of
a qualified legal services plan). These tax incentives were meant to encourage employers to provide prepaid legal service plans to employees. See S. REP. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 38-39 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3474-75. The favorable tax treatment of prepaid legal plans terminated in 1992.
188 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988) ("prepaid legal services plan" included in
definition of "employee welfare benefit plan" for purposes of regulation under the
Enployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)).
See Richard S. Dunham, Can Joel Hyatt Keep Ohio Metzenbaum Countr?, Bus.
WK., Nov. 29, 1993, at 134 (predicting growth of Hyatt Legal Services).
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The perceived benefits of prepaid legal services are very similar
to the perceived benefits of managed care, including reduction in
societal cost by increasing use of "preventive" services,9 0 promoting
integrated delivery of services," and expansion of services to those
unable to afford them under the fee-for-service system. 9 2 Similarly,
the ethical concerns raised by use of prepaid legal service plans are
similar to those raised by managed care.
There are generally considered to be two types of prepaid legal
service plan: ' open-panel plans and closed-panel plans. Openpanel plans permit the insured to choose the attorney and the plan
94
reimburses the attorney at an agreed rate for services rendered.
Any attorney who wishes to serve the plan's insureds may do so, provided she meets minimum qualifications. Under a closed-panel
plan, the plan chooses the attorney to provide services to the insured. '95 Attorneys providing services under closed-panel plans are
preselected by the plan, and the insured has no right to select another.'96 Closed-panel plans are far more common than open-panel
plans.
190 See NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CONSUMERS OF LEGAL SERVICES, GROUP
LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: ORGANIZATION, OPERATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1981); WERNER

PFENNIGSTORF & SPENCER L. KIMBELL, LEGAL SERVICE PLANS 152-64 (1977).
191See Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require
Zealous
RepresentationForPoor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97, 111 (1995); PhilipJ. Murphy,
The PrepaidLegal Services Picture,62 A.B.A.J. 1569, 1571 (1976).

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) ("IT]he middle
70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by the legal profession.") (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES 2 (1972)). But see Tara L. Lattomus, Note, Offensiveness, The New Standard
192

For First Amendment Legal Advertising Cases: Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 40 VILL.

L. REV. 1209, 1247 n.246 (1995) (arguing that ignorance regarding the cost of legal
services and competence of attorneys, not the actual cost of the services, constitutes
a barrier to individuals' use of attorneys).
193A distinction also exists between plans that provide telephone access to attorneys for consultation and questions and plans that provide actual access to attorneys
to provide legal services. The discussion in this section assumes a plan that provides
actual legal services in exchange for a prepaid premium, not merely a "hotline" for
consultation.
194 The analogy in health care is to a discounted fee-for-service plan,
where the
patient may choose any provider willing to accept the insurer's payment.
195The analogy in health care is to the staff or network model HMO, where the
subscriber must choose a primary care physician who is a member of the HMO's
network.
196 This is subject, of course, to rules governing conflicts of interests between clients. If the plan lawyer is prohibited from representing the insured, the plan is

generally responsible to select a lawyer with no conflict of interest to discharge the
plan's contractual obligation to the insured.
197 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman,
Rethinking Indigent Defense:
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Although there is no evidence of an impact on quality of legal
services provided through prepaid legal service plans,'98 the organized bar has been suspicious of such organizations.'" The American
Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
expressed a strong preference for open-panel plans through its 1974
amendments to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility."
The Model Rules, which have replaced the Model Code as the official ethical standard of the ABA and most state bars,20 ' do not continue this distinction 2 Several advisory opinions and treatises have
considered the ethical implications of lawyers practicing in a prepaid
environment. In addition, commentators have realized the similarity
between the situation of a lawyer practicing in a prepaid legal service
plan and a physician practicing in a managed care plan.Y0
PromotingEffective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choicefor
All CriminalDefendants,31 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 73, 81 n.21 (1994) (citing ThomasJ.
Hall, Comment, Prepaid Legal Services: Obstacles Hampering Its Growth and Development, 47 FORDH"m L. REv. 841,851-57 (1979)).
198 See Wayne Moore, Improving the Delivery of Legal Services for The Elderly: A
Comprehensive Approach, 41 EMoRYLJ. 805,831. Indeed,
[pirepaid legal services programs have been providing telephone advice for over twenty years, and the director of a national resource center for prepaid legal services cannot recall a malpractice claim. In the
seven years of operation of [Legal Counsel for the Elderly's] hotlines,
no one has filed a malpractice claim or even threatened to do so.
Id. (footnote omitted).
199

See id. at849 n.165.

See Model Code, supra note 2, DR 2-103(D)(4) (a); see also ROGER D. BILUINGS,
§ 3.2 at 53-54 (1981) ("[Under DR 2-103(D) (4) (a),] a
lawyer may work with an open panel plan whether or not it is for profit, but may
only work with a closed panel plan if it is not for profit."). Even in states that still
operate under the Model Code, however, ERISA may operate to prevent state ethics
rules from interfering with the operation of prepaid legal service plans subject to
ERISA. SeeJay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619,
649-50 nn. 116-18 (1994) (explaining that legislative intent of the broad preemption language adopted was to prevent states from prohibiting "closed panel" prepaid legal service plans); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of
ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35
(1997); see also Jay Conison, The Federal Common Law Of ERISA Plan Attorneys, 41
200

JR., PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES

REv. 1049, 1092-98 (1990).
See supra Part IV-A.

SYRACUSEL.
201

See Ann B. Stevens, Wyoming Rules Of Professional Conduct: A Comparative Analysis, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 463, 515 n.366 (1988) ("The detailed requirements in
the Code DR 2-103(d) (4), for a lawyer to take referrals from a prepaid legal services
plan, were not included in the Model Rules.").
203 See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 CEO.
WASH. L. REV.
169, 193 & n.108 (1997). Zacharias wrote:
Lawyers representing clients through prepaid legal services plans, like
doctors in parallel medical plans, may sense some obligation to
minimize costs.... In other words, to the extent the insurance plan
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The principle of independence of professional judgment 2is
potentially jeopardized by prepaid legal service plans.20 ' When the
third-party payor is the source of work for the attorney, the lawyer
has a clear incentive to conduct herself so as to please the payor and
generate future business. This danger is especially great in closed
panel plans, where the payor has control over the selection of lawyers
to represent its insureds.
A Maine State Bar Association ethics opinion2 0 6 states that it is a
violation of the rules regulating the Maine bar for an attorney to enter into a contract with a provider of prepaid legal services pursuant
to which the attorney would review the provider's standard legal
documents to ensure compliance with Maine law and provide ancillary services to insureds. The contract rejected by the Maine Bar Association further provided that the lawyer would not make any
changes in the standard documents not required by state law, would
not suggest to the client that the standard documents were inferior
in any way, and would not induce any client to take any action
"inconsistent with the participating attorney agreement." The state
ethics committee found that these provisions of the proposed contract violated the existing state bar rule prohibiting lawyers from althe lawyer's professional
lowing any third-party payor to influence
17
client.
her
representing
in
judgment
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION BASED ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Changes in the medical marketplace, along with concerns about
cost-containment, are creating an environment in which physicians
must advocate for the best interest of their patients in much the

pays on a fixed-cost basis or hires the lawyer for a finite period of
time, extending the scope of the services disadvantages the lawyer.
On the other hand, if the plan allows the lawyer to bill on a regular
time-spent basis, the plan will not be happy with the lawyer who fails
to minimize the time she spends on each case.
Id.; Julia Field Costich, Note, Joint State-Federal Regulation of Law~yers: The Case of
Group Legal Services underERISA, 82 KY. LJ. 627, 629 n.15 (1993).
"4
Seesupra Part IV-A-1.; Model Rules, supra note 2, at Rule 2.1, Rule 1.8(f), Rule

5.4(c).
205

See Robert Hermann, Prepaid Legal Services Coming of Age, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 438,

443 (1976) (noting lawyers' complaints that such plans unduly restrict independent
professional judgment).
206
See ProfessionalEthics Commission, Opinion No. 147, in 10 ME. B.J. 98 (Dec. 14,
1994).
207 See id. (citing Maine Bar Rule 3.4(e)).
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same way that lawyers advocate for the best interests of their clients. °8
The practice of medicine is much more adversarial than it once was,
and physicians as well as ethicists must take account of this reality.
Further, the physician-patient relationship and the lawyer-client relationship are both grounded on similar principles of trust and similar
ethical duties. 20 For these reasons, it is appropriate to look to the
treatment of conflicts of interest as they arise in the legal profession
for guidance on the handling of similar conflicts in the medical profession.
The conflicts of interest faced by physicians and lawyers paid for
professional services by third parties are fundamentally identical.
This is because both professions are faced with the dual problems of
third-party payors and financial incentives, whether overt or implicit,
to obtain certain results. The physician is faced with both overt210
and implicit " ' incentives to cut costs of medical care. The lawyer too
is faced with overt and implicit incentives to provide service at low
cost.212 In both cases, the professional is faced with the incentive to

reach results favorable to the payor, and not necessarily to the individual on whose behalf the payor is ostensibly acting. With this in
mind, it is instructive to apply the rules developed for the benefit of
attorneys and their clients to the modern practice of medicine.
A.

Inadequacy of Disclosure and Consent

As we have seen, commentators, the AMA, and the Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
208

See AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 8.13(2)(D) (IT] he physi-

cian's duty as patient advocate requires not only a challenge to any denials of treatment [under managed care organizations' guidelines], but also advocacy at [an
MCO'sl policy-making level."); PatriciaJ. Cummings, Third-Party Payor Tort Liability
for Utilization Review Decisions, 41 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 432, 439 (1995).

Since the physician still remains legally responsible for the medical
care delivered to a patient, despite any determinations by an insurer,
the physician must object to decisions that he or she considers detrimental to a patient's care, and the physician may also serve as an advocate in whatever appeal process is allowed under the terms of the
patient's insurance contract.
Id. But see id. at 448-49 ("[Plhysicians cannot reasonably be expected to act as patient advocates when demands on their time are so heavy.").

See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1072 (1976) (suggesting the physician209

patient model as worthy of emulation by lawyers).
2:10 See, e.g., supra Part II-B-1.
211

212

See, e.g., supraPart II-B-2.
See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

169, 184-85 (1997).
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Care Industry have argued in favor of mandatory disclosure to the
patient of a physician's potential conflicts of interest.""3 This proposed solution is modeled on the existing doctrine of informed consent to treatment.1 4 A physician must fully inform a patient of all
material risks and expected benefits arising from a proposed course
of treatment, and obtain the patient's affirmative assent thereto, before treatment is ethically" and legally permitted.1 6 By analogy,
therefore, current proposals to cure conflicts of interest with disclosure and consent require that the patient be fully informed of the
payment mechanism used to compensate physicians under his managed care plan.1
Merely requiring that the patient give consent to the existence
of the physician's conflict of interest is a problematic solution. At
bottom, this solution reflects a view of the physician-patient relationship as a contractual one, governed by the presumption that parties
to a private agreement may freely order their affairs as they wish, and
that the law will generally not step in to disturb a freely bargained-for
exchange. Under this model, the patient, upon giving consent to
the particular physician-patient relationship offered, has made a rational decision to exchange certain incidents of the traditional physician-patient relationship, such as a solely patient-centered ethic of
care, for the benefits of the non-traditional model, such as lower
cost, greater emphasis on preventive services, greater convenience,
or other real or perceived benefits of the managed care model. 21 8

213

See generally supra Part III-B.; Barbara

J.

Culliton, Managed Care and Conflict of

Interest, 2 NATURE MED. 489 (MAY 1996) (arguing for disclosure of physicians' financial incentives).
214 See AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 8.13(2)
(E).
215 See TOM L. BEAuCHAMp &JAMES

F. CHILDRESS,

PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics

142-70 (4th ed. 1994).
2,6 Failure to obtain informed consent transforms medical treatment into actionable battery, regardless of the outcome of such treatment.
217 Not all disclosure models require that the patient be given so much information. Current Federal regulations merely require that the patient be informed of
physician incentives affecting referral services, the type of incentive arrangement,
and whether stop-loss protection is provided. The plan need not disclose any incentives not affecting referral patterns, need not explain how the incentives used
can be expected to affect physician behavior, is only required to provide this limited
disclosure to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries (plans are merely "encouraged"
to provide disclosure to all enrollees), and need only provide disclosure at the request of the beneficiary, not as a matter of course.
218 See, e.g., AMA Code of Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 9.06 ("In choosing
to
subscribe to a health maintenance or service organization ... the patient is thereby
accepting limitations upon free choice of medical services.").
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However, certain features of the medical marketplace create a
setting in which true informed consent to this "bargain" may be difficult if not impossible to achieve. First, the disclosures necessary to
obtain informed consent themselves may damage the physicianpatient relationship by undermining the patient's trust in the physician. "' Second, the medical insurance marketplace also creates an
issue of timing of disclosure and consent. When will informed consent be obtained? Will it be when the patientjoins the managed care
plan?'
This may be possible if the patient has a wide range of
choices available to her; if, for instance, her employer offers a variety
of plans, ranging from traditional indemnity to closed-panel HMO
coverage. In such a case, the patient can weigh her alternatives and
make a rational, informed cost-benefit analysis. However, two problems exist with this model. The patient may not have as broad a
range of choices as in the ideal example; indeed, the patient may
have no real choice at all if the employer offers only one type of
health plan or if the cost of non-managed care alternatives is so high
as to be prohibitive. Employers increasingly seek to share the cost of
health care coverage with their employees,22' and the marginal dollar
of insurance cost to "upgrade" from managed care coverage to indemnity coverage may thus fall squarely on the employee.2n Also,
the patient may not fully consider the implications of managed care
incentive structures and other conflicts of interest because, after all,
she is not sick and in need of services at the time she signs up for a
health plan.
Further, choice of health benefits is often presented to new
employees in the context of the first days on the job, when many different and conflicting pressures compete for the employee's time,
further reducing the likelihood that adequate attention will be paid

219

See MORREIM, supra note 5, at 118; Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 21, at

1694 ("[Dlisclosure requirements of this sort are unlikely to reduce distrust.").
M This appears to be the approach favored by the AMA. See, e.g. AMA Code of
Ethics, supra note 2, at Opinion 8.13(2) (E) ("Full disclosure requires that managed
care plans inform potential subscribers of limitations or restrictions on the benefits
package when they are considering entering the plan."); Opinion 8.13(3) (A) ("Any
incentives to limit care must be disclosed fully to patients by plan administrators
upon enrollment and at least annually thereafter.").

See Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition:
Care, Cost and Coverage,

22J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 339, 349 (1997) (Employer spending on health care has
declined in recent years, but employee spending out of pocket has increased).
M See Rodwin, Consumer Protection, supra note 108, at 1032 ("Many consumers

prefer traditional health insurance to managed care; however, employers and thirdparty payors often do not offer it or make it affordable.").
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to the serious consequences of the choice made.25 Finally, if informed consent is obtained at the time of selection, this function will
not be performed by physicians, but by employees of either the managed care organization or, depending on the structure of the group
health plan, by a benefits manager at the employee/patient's employer. Neither of these individuals have either the experience with
conflicts of interest in the clinical setting or the ethical obligations to
the patient that the physician has, 4 and in the case of the managed
care organization's employee, there are likely to be further conflicts
of interest resulting in incentives to sign up the maximum number
of enrollees, perhaps resulting in an incomplete explanation of the
potential drawbacks of the managed care plan.
If not at the time of the initial health plan selection decision,
informed consent might also be obtained at the point of service.
This alternative would place the burden of achieving informed consent on the physician, the most appropriate individual to carry out
this burden. If we choose this alternative, however, we must necessarily ask how informed consent will be administered. Must informed consent be obtained for each office visit? For each separate
illness for which the patient consults the physician, even if that illness results in multiple encounters? Once at the outset of the physician-patient relationship, never to be repeated? None of these alternatives is wholly satisfactory. Obtaining consent at each office visit
imposes great administrative burdens on the physician and threatens
to desensitize the patient to the information conveyed, turning the
process into a mere legal formality. Obtaining consent once at the
outset of the physician-patient relationship carries the same defect as
obtaining consent at the time the patient signs up - the first visit is
not likely to be occasioned by a serious illness, but by a routine
physical examination or minor complaint. As such, the problems of
conflict of interest are not as severe, and the patient does not have
the same incentive seriously to consider how the problems may affect
her in the future, before binding herself to the managed care bargain.
The best of the alternatives would be to obtain informed consent at the onset of each course of treatment. This would minimize
problems of repetition of information, but would not irrevocably
2

See id. at 1034 ("Too much information, however, becomes noise and is as un-

enlightening as too little.").
22:See Yarmolinsky, supra note 50, at 602 ("Physician entrepreneurs
are constrained by professional training and professional ethics, whereas insurance companies or other business ventures. . . are not.").
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bind the patient to the bargain at the outset. Even this solution,
however, contains another problem: what to do if the patient, after
consideration of the bargain offered by the managed care company,
decides that it is in fact not in her best interest to accept that bargain? This is analogous to the problem faced by the insured defendant who foresees a conflict of interest with his insurer and objects
to the insurer's choice of lawyer-in many states, the insured, if he
desires separate representation, must pay for that representation out
of pocket. Will we impose the same requirement on the patient? To
do so would create a Hobson's choice for the patient, who would be
faced at the onset of illness with the obligation either to accept potentially substantially limited care or to shoulder a crushing financial
burden that she thought had been assumed by the insurer.2
To
force the health insurer to pay for a conflict-free (generally out-ofnetwork) physician in this situation, however, would undermine the
entire business of managed health care with free-rider incentives, as
patients could sign up for a lower-cost managed care alternative until
serious illness struck, then "opt out" of managed care and force the
managed care company to give up many of its cost control mechanisms (although coverage itself would not be artificially expanded),
thus increasing the cost of care. Unless we are willing to live with the
increase in costs occasioned by such a rule, or with the fact that the
consent obtained will not be fully informed in all cases, and patients
may be forced to live with unexpected and undesirable limitations
on care, disclosure and informed consent are not adequate regulatory responses. We must impose limits on the ability of the patient
to consent to alterations to the traditional physician-patient relationship.
B. A Proposal
As we have seen, the law governing lawyers imposes two fundamental duties on lawyers accepting payment for legal services from
third parties - the duty to obtain informed consent 2 6 and the duty
to exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client.22 In order to cure the inherent defects in a disclosure-only model, the law
can impose a duty to exercise independent judgment in the physician-patient context as well. This section will examine the contours
25

See Rodwin, Consumer Protection, supra note 108, at 1014 ("Opting out [of the

MCO's network] is not possible in all plans and not feasible for people with limited
resources.") (footnote omitted).
22
SeeModel Rules, supra note 2, at Rule 1.4(b), Rule 1.7(b),
Rule 1.8(0).
See id.at Rule 1.7(b), Rule 1.8(f), Rule 5.4(c).
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of such a duty, derived from Model Rule 1.7(b). Model Rule 1.7(b)
requires not only that the client consent after consultation to any obligation or interest of the lawyer that might affect the representation,
but that the lawyer also make a reasoned judgment that the representation will not affect the professional relationship. This requirement imposes an affirmative duty on the lawyer to make a judgment
about the external obligation or interest, and to resolve the potential
conflict of interest in favor of the client. It also protects the client by
imposing a standard of reasonableness on the lawyer's judgment,
asking whether a disinterested lawyer would believe that the professional relationship would not be harmed by the existence of the interest or obligation. If this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, or if the client does not consent, the lawyer may not
ethically accept the engagement.
Similarly, although current legal and ethical guidelines may require disclosure of a physician's conflicts of interest to the patient,
such disclosure does not adequately discharge the physician's duty to
act in the best interest of the patient. In order to give effect to this
duty, the following provision should be adopted by state legislatures
as part of medical licensure acts, or integrated into a proposed national "Patient Bill of Rights:"
A physician shall not enter into a contract with a managed care
company which contains financial incentives to limit care unless:
(a) Each patient whose care will be provided pursuant to such
contract consents to such incentives after full disclosure; and
(b) The physician reasonably believes that the financial incentives will not interfere with the exercise of her professional
judgment on behalf of the patient.
C. Benefits of the Proposal
Six tangible benefits would accrue to physicians and patients
from the adoption of this proposal. First, the proposed rule would
recognize the realities of the physician-patient contract. Although
the physician-patient relationship is fundamentally a contractual
one, it is also a relationship deserving of particular attention from
the law. Traditional concepts of freedom of contract are derived
from commercial law, which in turn is predicated on a paradigm of
arms-length bargaining for goods and services. Such a model assumes that the parties to the exchange bring to the table roughly
equal bargaining power. In situations in which this assumption is
false and the relationship between parties is instead characterized by
a fundamental inequality in bargaining power, the law has seen fit to
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apply special protections for the purpose of leveling the playing
field.
The physician-patient relationship is characterized by a fundamental inequality of bargaining power. The physician has the advantage of many years of specialized training, as well as the substantial
respect, trust and deference traditionally accorded physicians in our
society2 8 In contrast, the patient may have little or no formal education, or may be highly educated, but in a field that gives him no
knowledge of science or medicine. The patient is thus often singularly ill-equipped independently to judge the terms of the physicianpatient contract. In addition, the patient often establishes contact
with the physician when the patient is ill, and thus least able, whatever his level of knowledge, to bargain for terms. The sick patient
does not see his relationship with his physician as primarily an economic one, and the history of medicine is unfortunately replete with
examples of patients willing to suspend critical judgment and pay
any amount in exchange for the hope of a cure. In this context,
freedom of contract is an illusion, and the law must be willing to step
in to level the playing field where appropriate. The proposed rule
will help to equalize bargaining power by applying the physician's
traditional duty to act only in the interest of a patient to the context
of managed care contracting.
Second, the proposed rule would reaffirm the physician's duty
to protect her patient's best interests. We have seen that medical
ethics recognizes that a physician's first duty is to her patient, and
that the physician's personal or financial interest must be subordinated to the interest of the patient. We have also seen that many financial incentives used by managed care organizations create at least
a potential conflict between the physician's financial interest and the
patient's interest in maximizing the care provided. In many cases,
such financial incentives can merely work to reverse the worst excesses of fee-for-service medicine and provide an incentive to deliver
only medically appropriate care. However, the possibility always exists that a particular financial incentive will cross the line between incentivizing appropriate cost-effective behavior and incentivizing inappropriate withholding of beneficial and necessary treatment. If a

22
See, e.g., Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Doctor's Dilemma: Wom to Serve?, 87 J.
ROYAL Soc'y. OF MED. 31 (Supp. No. 22 1994) ("The social contract . .. has afforded
the physician: privileged status; privileged access to the lives of others; autonomy;
and ceded expertise in scientific and technical matters, as well as design and control
of the system of medical education, training and clinical care, and definition of the
needs of patients.").
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financial incentive interferes with the physician's exercise of independent judgment on behalf of her patients, it is at high risk of incentivizing inappropriate behavior and should be condemned.' If a
disinterested physician (one operating without the effect of a financial incentive) would agree that the potential conflict of interest
merely incentivizes cost-effective behavior and is consistent with the
exercise of independent judgment in the best interests of the patient, then the financial incentive is perfectly permissible.'"
Third, the proposed rule is consistent with the ethical principle
of patient autonomy. Autonomy is the principle that the patient has
the right to decide what shall be done with and to his body. Autonomy has two components: liberty, or freedom from undue influence; and agency, or freedom to take independent intentional acts.'
The proposed rule is consistent with both elements of autonomy. It
ameliorates the potential for overreaching by managed care organizations and physicians in defining the terms of the physician-patient
relationship, and the patient retains the right to choose for himself
whether or not to consent to any proposed delivery structure or
package of financial incentives offered by the market.
Fourth, the proposed rule is not overinclusive - it does not
condemn all potential conflicts of interest as unethical. Such a position would be untenable, as it is impossible in a market economy to
design a health care delivery system that does not create incentives
for the physician to change her behavior so as to maximize reimbursement and, thus, potential conflicts of interest with the patient's
interest in maximizing effective medical care. Further, there are certainly financial incentives that operate to the benefit of both individual patients and society at large by counteracting the incentives of

2" By condemning incentives that interfere with a physician's
independent
judgment, this proposal should not be read to condemn appropriate utilization review or peer review practices, but only to condemn those financial incentives that
unduly encourage a physician to consider factors other than patient welfare in makinuclinical decisions.
See Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives, supra note 26, at 192 ("Given the impossibility of avoiding incentives to limit care entirely, the only question is how much of
an incentive should be allowed. ... What we are looking for is a level of incentive
that is large enough to make physicians conscious of costs without being so large
that patient welfare is endangered.").
231 See BEAucHAmp & CHILDRESS, supra note 215, at 121.
2
See CEJA Report, supra note 43, at 7 ("Physicians should avoid reimbursement systems that cannot be disclosed to patients without negatively affecting the
physician-patient relationship."); MoRREIM, supra note 5, at 121 ("If the physician
cannot... justify a particular... incentive ... to his patients, then perhaps the ...
incentive itself needs to be reconsidered.").
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fee-for-service medicine to provide excess care and by conserving societal health care dollars for use in more appropriate ways. 2" The
proposal recognizes that a system of professional regulation can appropriately rely on the ethical nature of individual practitioners to
resist the siren call of self-enrichment at the expense of the patient. 2
Only where this temptation becomes particularly strong does the law
need to act,2" and, even in those cases, it is appropriate to draw our
standard for evaluation of questionable incentives from the expertise
and experience of the profession."
Fifth, the proposed standard has the advantage of flexibility. It
is not a specific prohibition on a particular impermissible financial
incentive or contract term. Although these prohibitions, such as recently-popular legislative bans on "gag clauses" in managed care contracts, are easy to administer, they suffer from inflexibility, as they
cannot adapt to the innovations of the marketplace, but require continual legislative revision so as not to become obsolete. In contrast, a
standard such as the proposed rule adopts can adapt to changing
market conditions - what is an impermissible financial incentive
may change from year to year, from city to city, or from specialty to
specialty.
Finally, the proposed rule provides a standard for evaluation of
insurers' and providers' practices and enforcement of ethical standards by licensing authorities. Every state currently has in place a
medical licensing board with authority to define standards of conduct for licensed physicians. These state boards are in a position to
undertake review and assessment of ethically questionable practices
and impose appropriate sanctions for violation.

233

Cf MOR EIM, supra note 5 (arguing for consideration of physicians' duties in

the broader context of health care as a whole, not just within the individual physician-patient relationship); Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives, supra note 26, at 164-79
(1995).
2s4 See MORREIm, supra note 5, at 121-23; Yarmolinsky, supra
note 50, at 602
(explaining that it is more realistic than banning financial incentives "simply to require that the individual or group that balances professional effort expended and
cornyensation received should be subject to professional standards.").
See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: ProtectingPatientsfrom their Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291, 386 (1994).
236 See Barondess, supra note 228, at 34 ('[F] or the physician, it becomes an issue
of how much dilution of the... responsibility he or she holds can occur before professionalism is seriously threatened.").
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D. Relationship to PreviousProposals
In a law review article published in 1994, Professor Mary Anne
Bobinski proposed a similar standard for regulation of providers' fiProfessor Bobinski proposed that
nancial conflicts of interest."
states should
[p]rohibit physicians from providing treatment to patients when
a financial incentive [to provide excess care] might unreasonably
adversely affect the physician's exercise of medical judgment
2M8
about whether treatment is necessary.
Professor Bobinski's proposal provides many of the same benefits as the approach proposed by this Article; however, important differences remain. Professor Bobinski notes that her proposal does
not address the question of which financial incentives "adversely" affect a physician's judgment. The mere fact that an incentive causes a
physician to consider the costs and benefits of a proposed course of
action should not be sufficient cause to condemn the incentive;... in
fact, incentives are adopted precisely in order to affect physician behavior.
This Article's proposal answers the question of which incentives
"adversely" affect a physician's judgment. Based on the ethical requirement that a physician act as the advocate of her patient's interest in preference to her own self-interest or a third party's or societal
interest, this Article proposes that an incentive should be condemned if it interferes with the physician's exercise of independent
professional judgment on behalf of the patient. This is consistent
with the recent position taken by the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the AMA that
[ilt is entirely appropriate for physicians to feel some obligation
to safeguard broader health care resources[.] Adopting dual
roles is only cause for concern when the roles are given equal or
nearly equal status and the primacy of individual patient care is
threatened.2 4
Professor Bobinski also questions whether such a standard is
workable, given the important societal interest in containing health
care costs.2 4' Her response to this potential criticism is to apply a
transactional prohibition only to financial incentives that encourage

237

See Bobinski, supra note 235, at 386.

23

Id. at 385-86 & n.354.

:39

See CEJA Report, supra note 43, at 2.

240

Id.

241

See Bobinski, supra note 235, at 386.
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provision of excess care, and to impose only a disclosure and consent
requirement on financial incentives to limit care. As we have seen,
however, in recent years the overwhelming concern of commentators
is that, in the rush to contain costs, managed care organizations have
imposed incentives that encourage physicians to withhold necessary
and appropriate care. In light of this development, and in light of
the previously discussed difficulties with reliance solely on disclosure
and consent in the medical marketplace, it is this Article's contention that ajudicious mix of disclosure and consent requirements and
tailored transactional prohibitions is an appropriate response to
economic incentives to provide too little care. This Article's proposal should not, of course, be read to prohibit appropriately crafted
financial incentives that operate to maximize the utility of health
care resources.
In his 1993 book Medicine, Money and Morals, Professor Marc
Rodwin engaged in a systematic analysis of physicians' conflicts of interest. Professor Rodwin argued that disclosure of physicians' financial interests alone is not sufficient to cure the conflicts of interest
presented by those financial interests. Professor Rodwin was primarily concerned with financial incentives to provide excess care, such as
physician self-referral for ancillary services, rather than with the
problem of financial incentives to deny care, which has intensified
since the publication of Rodwin's book.2 4 2 Rodwin concluded that
"as a rule, it makes sense to disqualify physicians who have significant
conflicts of interest."2 43 Rodwin does not provide a standard forjudging whether a particular conflict of interest is "significant," or impermissibly strong, and his "disqualification" remedy seems better
suited to fee-for-service medicine, with its wide freedom of patient
choice and incentives to provide excess care, than to today's managed care market, with its restrictions on patient choice of provider
and incentives to provide suboptimal care. 24 Rodwin concludes that
the practice of MCOs sharing utilization-based risk with physicians
242 See RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS, supra
note 27, at 233 (1993) (maintaining
that six of seven types of conflicts of interest involve incentives to provide more
care, not to provide less care).
243 Id. at 215.
244 It is not clear what form "disqualification"
would take in a managed care plan,
particularly a closed-panel plan. Since the enrollee is limited to seeing physicians
who are on the plan's panel of providers, and since every physician contracting to
participate on the panel will be subject to the same (presumably) objectionable financial incentives, the patient has a choice of providers in form only. Further, to
give the patient the right to select an out-of-plan provider in these circumstances
would threaten to undermine the cost-containment and quality assurance foundations of the managed care system. See supra Part V-A.
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should be prohibited, even if the amount of risk accepted by the
physician is limited.145 Rodwin argues that if the amount of risk assumed by the physician is high enough to influence behavior positively, it is high enough to pose a risk of perverse incentives and undesirable provider behavior. 246 Rodwin would prefer that incentives
be linked to the clinical value of medical interventions ordered, not
to the volume of medical care provided.247 If prohibition proves impossible, Rodwin suggests stringent caps on the amount of risk that
physicians are permitted to bear. 24S Rodwin's proposal is that physician risk-sharing be limited to one percent to two percent of the physician's baseline compensation. 49
While it is easy to sympathize with Rodwin's argument that any
changed physician behavior threatens inappropriate physician behavior, the managed care marketplace and regulatory authorities
have not to date followed his prescriptions. Although certain physician conflicts of interest have been regulated by proscription 2 -" regulators have not seen fit to proscribe financial incentives to limit care.
Federal regulation in this area is very limited, applying only to incentives to limit referrals to specialty physicians, and then only to physician risk-sharing above twenty-five percent of physicians' base compensation - a far cry from Professor Rodwin's advocacy of a one
percent or two percent cap on risk-sharing.'
This regulatory approach may reflect a policy determination that incentives to limit
care can appropriately counteract the incentives to overspend created by physicians' traditional training 2 and fee-for-service medi245
246
247

See RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS, supranote 27, at 232.

See id. at 232.
See id. at 233. The emphasis on quality-based guidelines instead of quantity-

based guidelines is echoed by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association when it proposes that managed care plans should
develop incentives based on quality of outcomes rather than on cost of services performed. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
248 See RODWIN, MONEY AND MORALS, supra
note 27, at 233.
249 See id..
250
Cf 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1997) (popularly referred to as the Stark Laws)
(proscribing physician self-referral in the provision of certain enumerated ancillary
services, and prohibiting compensation in exchange for referrals). For a survey of
laws prohibiting physician self-referrals, see generally James C. Dechene and Karen
P. O'Neill, Stark 11 and State Self-Referral Restrictions, 29 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65
(1996).
251
See also Orentlicher, FinancialIncentives, supra note 26, at 193 ("[lIt appears
that financial incentives for physicians should be somewhere in the fifteen to thirty
percent range.").
252 When my wife was a medical student, her medical school required a course in
Cost-Effective Medicine as part of the clinical years. This course was referred to de-
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cine. If this is true, then the appropriate focus for regulators should
be how much risk can and should be borne by physicians. This Article proposes as a standard that whenever a financial incentive unreasonably interferes with a physician's duty to act solely as her patient's
advocate, and substitutes instead an obligation or unreasonable incentive to act for the benefit of herself, a managed care organization,
society, or any other third party, that incentive should be legally
condemned.
VI. CONCLUSION

The medical profession and the laws governing it have heretofore relied primarily on the mechanism of disclosure and consent to
police conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives to limit
care. However, characteristics of the marketplace for health services
reduce the efficacy of disclosure and consent as a means of policing
managed care contracts. Consumer choice is limited, and individuals often lack the knowledge or economic power to make informed
choices among offered alternatives. Although respect for patient
autonomy requires disclosure to patients of limitations on coverage,
including financial incentives and conflicts of interest, an effective
policing mechanism for managed care contracting must supplement
disclosure and consent with an affirmative ethical duty on the part of
physicians to place patients' interests first. Placing patients' interests
first means that physicians may not make clinical decisions based on
self-interest, or the interest of any third party. It should also mean
that physicians must not place themselves in a position where they
will face strong incentives to make clinical decisions based on selfinterest or the interests of others.
This Article suggests implementation of such a duty based on
the legal profession's duty to use independent judgment on behalf
of the client and to avoid professional relationships in which one's
self-interest or duty to a third party interfere with that independence
ofjudgment. Whether adopted as part of a national "Patient's Bill of
Rights" or on a state-by-state basis as part of the regulation of the
medical profession, the regulation proposed by this Article would
give legal effect to physicians' recognized ethical duties, and would
protect patients from the worst excesses of managed care costcontainment.

risively by the students as "Care-Defective Medicine," a trenchant comment on the
perception of the cost-containment initiatives of managed care.

